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This chapter is concerned with inter-industry studies of the relations
among various measures of market structure, conduct, and performance.1
Prior to the seminal work of Joe Bain (1951, 1956), most empirical research
in industrial organization involved detailed case studies of particular
industries. These were time-consuming, involved a great deal of subjective
judgement, and covered only a small sample of industries, in many of which
antitrust litigation had made data available. Bain's inter-industry,
cross-section approach seemed to make possible rapid and objective analysis
of large samples of markets. Research interest accordingly shifted from
industry studies to inter-industry work during the 1960's.
In a comprehensive survey written at the start of the 1970's, Weiss
(1974) discussed 46 cross-section studies of the correlates of seller
concentration. Ten years later, Gilbert (1984) found 45 such studies of the
U.S. banking industry alone. But during this same decade a number of
critics effectively challenged the data and methods used in inter-industry
research, as well as the conventional interpretation of its findings.
Interest shifted to work on the theory of imperfectly competitive markets
and, more recently, to econometric industry studies employing formal models
of conduct. Inter-industry studies are now out of fashion.
While some feel that fashion is unjust because cross-section research
can reveal the structural parameters that determine market conduct and
performance, others contend that the cross-section approach is inherently
incapable of producing anything useful. In the next section I argue for an
intermediate position: cross-section studies rarely if ever yield consistent
estimates of structural parameters, but they can produce useful stylized
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3facts to guide theory construction and analysis of particular industries.
They typically fail to be persuasive when they attempt to do much more than
this. Inter-industry research can complement industry studies by describing
robust relations that hold across large samples of markets.
Cross-section studies also fail to be persuasive when they ignore
serious measurement problems. Section 3 considers some of these, focusing
on the problem of measuring profitability. Again I take an intermediate
view: these problems deserve to be taken seriously but, if handled sensibly,
they are not so severe as to render cross-section work valueless.
Sections 4-6 discuss the main empirical regularities that have been
uncovered in inter-industry research. The discussion is organized by
dependent variable: Section 4 describes studies that attempt to explain
differences in profitability, Section 5 considers studies of prices and
costs, and Section 6 discusses studies of concentration, advertising
intensity, and conduct-related variables. Section 7 contains a few
concluding remarks.
The literature discussed here is enormous, and this essay is inevitably
incomplete despite its length. The reference list at the end is biased
toward recent works (and full, book-length presentations) in which earlier
contributions are discussed. A number of previous surveys treat some topics
in more depth than is possible here.2
2. Method and Interpretation
2.1 Long-Run Equilibria and the Endogeneity Problem
The usual presumption in cross-section work in all fields of economics
is that observed differences across observations reflect differences in
4long-run equilibrium positions. 3 Thus, for instance, cross-section studies
of demand are usually interpreted as producing estimates of long-run
elasticities.
In general, in order to use cross-section data to estimate long-run
relations, deviations from long-run equilibrium must be uncorrelated with
the independent variables employed. If this strong requirement (discussed
further below) is satisfied, and if theoretically sound structural equations
can be formulated and identified, simultaneous equations techniques can be
employed to yield consistent estimates of long-run structural parameters.
In order to estimate any structural equation consistently, one must
generally have at least as many available instrumental variables as there
are variables on the right-hand side of the equation. Instrumental
variables must be exogenous -- that is, uncorrelated with the structural
residual. If an equation has K endogenous variables and L exogenous
variables on the right hand side, consistent estimation requires at least K
additional instrumental variables that (a) can be excluded from the equation
on theoretical grounds and (b) are correlated with one or more of the
included endogenous variables. I now argue that the instruments necessary
for consistent estimation are rarely available in inter-industry empirical
work in industrial organization.
Inter-industry studies in industrial organization are part of an
enterprise that seeks tools, based on either deductive or inductive
analysis, that permit one to make useful predictions about real markets
based on relatively stable, observable variables. These quantities, which
together comprise market structure, are loosely divided into two sets.
Intrinsic structural variables rcalled basic conditions by Scherer (1980)]
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5are more or less completely determined by the nature of the product and the
available technologies for production and marketing. Other elements of
market structure are derived in that they may reflect government policy,
business strategies, or accidents of history, as well as the relevant
intrinsic variables. Lists of derived structural variables usually include
seller concentration, conditions of entry, buyer concentration, and product
differentiation.
In any complete market model, such as the textbook models of monopoly
and competition, market structure determines market conduct -- the
behavioral rules followed by buyers, sellers, and potential entrants to
choose the variables under their control. Market performance is assessed by
comparing the results of market conduct to first-best ideals, such as
perfect competition, or feasible alternatives.
Most of the cross-section literature has been concerned with the
effects of intrinsic structural variables on derived structure and with the
effects of structure as a whole on conduct and performance. But, except in
textbook competitive markets, derived market structure is clearly affected
by market conduct in the long run. Mergers and investments alter seller
concentration; marketing strategies may affect product differentiation; the
attractiveness of entry depends on the actual and expected conduct of
established sellers. And, though the linkages may be looser, intrinsic
structure is also affected by conduct in the long run. Invention and
innovation can change the nature of the product and the available
technologies. Industry-specific aspects of government policy are generally
affected by industries' lobbying and other political activity and may also
be affected by observed performance.
6Thus, in the long run equilibria with which cross-section studies must
be primarily concerned, essentially all variables that have been employed in
such studies are logically endogenous. This means that there are in general
no theoretically exogenous variables that can be used as instruments to
identify and estimate any structural equation. (Even if one is willing to
argue that intrinsic structure is approximately exogenous, one has only a
small number of potential instrumental variables. And these are difficult
to observe because actual characteristics of existing firms or plants are
not determined only by intrinsic structure.) Moreover, recent theoretical
work emphasizes the complexity of market conduct and its determinants and
thus makes it difficult to argue strongly for the exclusion of any variable
from any structural equation.
Several authors, beginning with Strickland and Weiss (1976), have
estimated three-equation models, with profitability, advertising, and
concentration all treated as endogenous.4 An examination of some of the
specification and exogeneity assumptions made in a leading example of this
approach makes the basic endogeneity problem clear. Martin (1979a) needs
two instruments to identify and estimate his profitability equation. He
employs a durable good dummy variable and lagged values of concentration and
profitability. Given the long-run equilibrium presumption and the
likelihood that departures from long-run equilibrium are serially
correlated, it seems unlikely that lagged endogenous variables are generally
valid instruments in cross-section studies. He treats the ratio of imports
to sales as exogenous, even though high domestic prices should attract
imports [Geroski (1982), Caves (1985)]. And he also treats as exogenous
three variables that depend on the technologies actually employed by the
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7industry's firms. Since these depend on seller conduct as well as the menu
of available technologies, they are unlikely to be valid instruments.
Martin excludes the three technology-based variables mentioned above
from his structural equation for advertising intensity, even though it is
unclear in theory why marketing decisions should not depend on production
technology. He uses these three variables, along with a regional markets
dummy and lagged profitability and concentration, as instruments. The
validity of all these seems suspect, with the possible exception of the
regional dummy. Similar problems affect Martin's concentration equation.
Some authors have treated additional variables as endogenous. 5 The
longer the list of endogenous variables in any model, the more difficult it
is to obtain valid instruments from available data. It seems very unlikely
that the endogeneity problem posed here can be solved by more elaborate
nodel specifications. Nor can this problem be simply dismissed by the
observation that least-squares and simultaneous equations methods generally
yield very similar estimates. The relation between these estimates is
entirely determined by the set of variables used as instruments.6 And
specification tests of the sort employed by Geroski (1982), Connolly and
Hirschey (1984), and others to test for endogeneity are valid only if one
has available a sufficient number of instruments known priori to be valid.
Consistent structural estimation is possible without instrumental
variables in recursive systems,7 but arguments for recursivity are rarely
made in this literature. Similarly, panel data, in which a set of firms or
industries is observed over time, can yield consistent structural estimates
if an explicit model of disequilibrium behavior is employed. But this has
rarely been done; almost all inter-industry studies have had only a cross-
8section dimension, and studies using panel data have generally had a non-
structural, descriptive focus.
2.2 Design and Interpretation
Even if cross-section studies in industrial organization generally can
only describe relations among long-run equilibrium values of endogenous
variables, such studies can make a contribution. But they should be
designed, executed, and interpreted with due regard for their limitations.
A simple example will help to structure the discussion. Consider a
competitive market in which data are available only on price (P) and
quantity (Q), both endogenous variables. Suppose further that it is
considered reasonable to work with linear approximations to the supply and
demand curves:
QS = a + bP + e, (2.la)
Qd = a - BP + E, (2.lb)
where e and summarize the effects of the exogenous variables affecting
supply and demand, respectively. Working with the reduced form of (2.1), it
is easy to see that the variances of price and quantity and the covariance
between them implied by this model are as follows:
(b+B)2Opp = aE + aee - 2aeE, (2.2a)
(b+0) 2QQ = b2aCE + 20ee + 2 biOae, (2.2b)
(b+O)2apQ = b - OBee + (-b)oeE. (2.2c)
These three equations in five unknowns (b, , cee, aot, and Oet) cannot
generally be solved for unique estimates of b or . But this does not mean
that data on price and quantity provide no useful information.
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9In early studies of the demand for agricultural products, for instance,
it was argued that ee was much larger than at. In this case least squares
estimation of (2.lb) yields an approximately consistent estimate of ~.
Alternatively, suppose that one feels that B = 0 but observes pQ < 0.
Equation (2.2c) shows immediately that Pet = Oet/[OeeOtt] /2 must be
positive. The plausibility of this implication can perhaps be evaluated on
the basis of theory and evidence from other contexts. More formally, with B
= 0, equations (2.2) can be solved for pet as a function of pp, aQQ, OpQ,
and b. Using this relation, and allowing for sampling variability, one can
ask whether plausible values of the elasticity of supply are consistent with
plausible values of PeE'
The first point of this example is that data on endogenous variables do
provide information, though not the sort that can be handled by commonly-
employed estimation techniques. For models noticeably more complex than
(2.1), such information can be quite difficult to interpret. [Explicit
latent variable models may be useful here; see Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn, and
Wansberg (1984).] The second point is that even in simple models, the
interpretation of relations among endogenous variables requires a good deal
of prior information. Since the prior information one brings to any
empirical study is derived both from theory and from previous empirical
work, this suggests (correctly, I think) that progress is often made by
assembling pieces of theory and evidence from a variety of sources, rather
than through definitive tests of critical hypotheses.
All this implies that the primary objective in cross-section studies
must be to describe the main patterns in the data set employed as clearly
and completely as possible. The appropriate mind-set, which some recent
10
work seems clearly to reflect, is accordingly that of descriptive
statistics, not structural hypothesis testing. Of course, all correlations
are not created equal. Theory and previous empirical work must determine
what is worth studying and how it should be measured. Structural hypotheses
must inevitably play a key role at the design stage, even when the
endogeneity problem prevents structural estimation and testing. on the
other hand, strong and robust relations among variables with economic
content should always be reported, even if they don't make sense in light of
existing theory; they may be central to the development of better theory.
Regression analysis may be an appropriate technique for data
description in many cases. But in a world of what Krasker, Kuh, and Welsch
(1983) describe as "dirty data and flawed models," ordinary least squares
(and other methods based on second moments) should be supplemented by the
techniques they and others have developed for detecting and dealing with
extreme observations. [For a striking example of the effects of outliers in
cross-section data, see Cohen, Levin, and Mowery (1987).] And if
statistical analysis is to be used as a tool to summarize data, rather than
to estimate structural models, it is important to let the data speak. This
points toward the use of relatively simple specifications and careful
treatment of specification uncertainty [Leamer (1983), Bothwell, Cooley, and
Hall (1984), Connolly and Hirschey (1984)].
The almost exclusive attention paid to t- and F-statistics in much
cross-section work is inconsistent with the methodological viewpoint taken
here. Such statistics do help the reader sort out the impact of sampling
variation, of course. But the relation between structural hypotheses and
estimated coefficients is often unclear or controversial. (Indeed, the
III
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existence of competing structural explanations for the findings of many
cross-section studies is both a reason why this line of research has fallen
from favor and a symptom of the general impossibility of structural
estimation in this context.) From the descriptive point of view, equal
interest usually attaches to the magnitude of estimated coefficients and to
the contribution of particular independent variables to explaining the
variance of the dependent variable. In the supply-demand example, the t-
statistic on the slope coefficient in a least squares estimate of (2.la)
would be of interest, but it would provide only a small fraction of the
information in the data. In the present context, one would like to know not
just whether concentrated industries are on average more profitable than
unconcentrated industries, but also whether the difference (if any) is large
or trivial.
In general, descriptive work should be concerned with measurement and
data summarization in the broadest sense. Convincing evidence on the
validity of structural hypotheses rarely emerges from a single empirical
study -- here or in other branches of economics. Progress is facilitated if
the main features of individual data sets are fully described, so that
diverse studies can be compared and contrasted. Improvements in data
collection and measurement methods are likely to add more value than
refinements in the specification of underidentified structural equations.
Because it is often not clear how best to measure many variables
suggested by theory, the most interesting empirical relations are those-that
are robust to plausible variations in measurement methods as well as to
variations in specification. And because different countries often have
different accounting conventions and construct official data in different
12
ways, and we seek economic laws that hold across national boundaries,
international replications are especially valuable. [The use of matched
Canadian and U.S. industries by Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980), Baldwin
and Gorecki (1985), and a few others is noteworthy in this context.]
Finally, it is important to recall that if departures from long-run
equilibrium are correlated with the independent variables, cross-section
studies will produce a biased picture of relations among long-run
equilibria. And such correlations are often plausible. Capital-intensive
industries tend to be concentrated and to have cyclically sensitive
profitability, for instance. New industries or those that have been
disturbed by major innovations are likely to be farther from equilibrium
than others, with the direction of departure from equilibrium dependent on
the source and nature of the innovation. All of this points to the
desirability of attempting to control for departures from equilibrium in
cross section, of using replication to check for robustness with respect to
sample selection and period of study, and of employing panel data
creatively. Panel data sets make it possible in principle to control for or
to study cyclical and secular disequilibria and to analyze directly the
long-run differences among industries.8 Panel data share another very
desirable feature with data on geographically-separated markets in a single-
industry: they make it possible to control for unobservable industry-
specific variables by focusing on differences over time or across space.
The descriptive orientation presented here implies that cross-section
studies in industrial organization should be modest, both in their goals and
in their conclusions, since it is generally impossible to estimate
structural models complex enough to be theoretically defensible. Modesty
11
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would go a long way toward making cross-section studies persuasive, thus
putting them on the same plane as good cross-section work in other fields.
Consistent with this orientation, I concentrate in Sections 4-6 on empirical
regularities that seem to be robust to variations in specification, time
period, country, and plausible changes in variable definition.9 Theory
enters in discussions of measurement and specification choice, but I do not
attempt to provide definitive structural interpretations of results.
3. Measuring Key Variables
Most of the cross-section literature focuses on relations involving one
or more of the following variables: profitability, concentration, and
barriers to entry. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 consider measures of profitability
that have been employed (and attacked) in this literature. Sections 3.3 and
3.4 discuss measurement of concentration and barriers to entry,
respectively.
3.1 Measures of Profitability
The many measures of profitability that have been employed in the
cross-section literature fall into four basic classes. First, Bain (1951,
1956) argued that the relevant theory deals with the ability of firms to
hold price above long-run average cost, where "cost" is defined as usual to
include competitive returns on capital employed. Since most firms (and
plants) produce multiple products, this suggests using the ratio of excess
profit to sales revenue. Only Qualls (1972) and a few others have used
accounting-based estimates of this measure of profitability, perhaps because
it requires an estimate of the competitive rate of return on capital
employed.
14
Second, many studies have employed accounting rates of return on assets
or equity. Bain (1951, 1956) used the after-tax rate of return on equity
because of data limitations, and other authors have employed the before-tax
rate of return on equity and the before- and after-tax rates of return on
assets. [Returns on assets are most naturally defined to include both
interest payments and profits; see Schmalensee (1976).] Before-tax measures
are undistorted by peculiarities of tax systems, though long-run (risk-
adjusted) after-tax (economic) rates of return should be equalized under the
null hypothesis of perfect competition. Increases in leverage make the
residual return to equity more variable, and in competitive capital markets
investors must generally be paid higher average returns to compensate.
Rates of return on assets, on the other hand, will mainly reflect operating
results, not capital structure decisions.
Third, Collins and Preston (1968, 1969) introduced and employed the
so-called price-cost margin (PCM), which can generally be computed for more
narrowly-defined markets than accounting rates of return. Consider a firm
with long-run constant returns to scale, and let v = variable cost per unit,
6 = depreciation rate of capital, p = competitive rate of return, P = price,
Q = output, and K = dollar value of capital employed. Then the markup of
price over long-run average (and marginal) cost is given by
P - v - (p+6(K) = P - Q (p+6) K (3.1)
P- PQ - (31)
The first quantity on the right, (revenue - variable cost)/revenue, is the
PCM. Under competitive conditions, the PCM should on average equal the
second quantity on the right of equation (3.1), the required rental on
assets employed per dollar of sales. Many authors have used the PCM as the
Ill
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dependent variable in linear regressions and included the ratio of assets
(sometimes depreciable assets) to revenue among the independent variables.
In light of (3.1), this procedure amounts to assuming that both the
competitive rate of return, p, and the rate of depreciation, 6, are the same
for all industries in the sample.
Fourth, measures that employ the market value of a firm's securities
(often, because of data limitations, only its common stock) are attractive
because, under the widely-accepted hypothesis of capital market efficiency,
the market value of a firm's securities reflects all available information
about its future profitability [Schwert (1981)]. In an early study, Stigler
(1963) employed the ratio of the market value of a firm's equity to its
inflation-adjusted book value. Two other measures have been widely used.
Tobin's q, defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the
replacement cost of its tangible assets, should on average equal one under
the competitive null hypothesis if (and only if) intangible assets are not
present [Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Salinger (1984)]. The excess value
ratio (EVR), defined as (market value - book value)/revenue, was introduced
by Thomadakis (1977) as a measure of the ratio of (capitalized) excess
profits to sales. [Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984) compare these
two measures.]
Are all these measures so highly correlated with one another that
debates about their relative merits are pointless? At least for the last
three classes of measures, the answer seems to be as follows:10
Stylized Fact 3.1: Correlations among accounting rates of return
are high, and regression results are usually not sensitive to
which measure of this type is employed. Correlations of
16
accounting rates of return with the PCM and with measures based on
market values are lower, and regression results often depend on
which type of measure is used.
The weak correlation between the PCM and the ratio of accounting profits to
sales reported by Liebowitz (1982a) and others suggests important inter-
industry differences in rates of depreciation and competitive rates of
return.
3.2 Accounting Problems
All of the profitability measures mentioned above rely on accounting
data, even those also using data on securities prices [Schwert (1981)]. As
Benston (1985) demonstrates, it is easy to list many reasons why accounting
data yield noisy measures of economic variables. (The PCM is particularly
easy to criticize because it omits capital costs.) Important problems arise
because large firms are generally active in many markets. Firm-level data
are thus multi-market aggregates, while data constructed at the plant level
do not reflect costs incurred at the firm level, and the allocation of those
costs to individual lines of business is inevitably somewhat arbitrary.1 1
On the other hand, it is unlikely that accounting numbers are pure
noise: firms use accounting data (though perhaps not the aggregates in
published reports) in decision-making, and many studies in the finance and
accounting literatures find that the stock market reacts to the publication
of accounting reports. While the signal to noise ratio in accounting data
is of interest, the more important question is the extent to which errors in
accounting data are correlated (positively or negatively) with independent
variables used in regression analysis. If such correlations are important,
coefficient estimates will be biased, and statistical studies, even with
Ill
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large samples, may miss real relations involving true, economic
profitability and report spurious relations that are mere artifacts of
accounting practices.
Stigler (1963) noted that owners of small U.S. corporations have an
incentive to pay themselves high salaries, and thus to understate their
accounting profits, in order to avoid the double taxation of dividend
income. His results indicate that small corporations tend to account for a
large share of industry assets the lower is concentration. [See also
Kilpatrick (1968) on adjusting for the effects of this incentive.] One can
argue on theoretical grounds that managers have strategic and public
relations incentives to under-state high profits and over-state low profits,
though the extent of such behavior has apparently not been systematically
studied.
More recently, considerable attention has been focused on
capitalization and depreciation practices and inflation as sources of bias.
Much of the relevant theoretical literature [see especially Stauffer (1971)
and Fisher and McGowan (1983)] has considered a firm composed of a large
number of identical investment projects. Each project requires an initial
outlay of one dollar and produces a net cash flow of (rT) dollars when it is
T periods old, with all dollar figures deflated to some base period.
Suppose there are no taxes and the following relation holds:
1 = J (T)e- rT dt, (3.2)
0
so that r is the real, economic rate of return on the firm's operations.
To see how r relates to accounting rates of return, let I(t) be the
number of projects the firm starts in period t, and let P(t) be the ratio of
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prices in period t to those in the base period. Thus P(t)I(t) is the
current dollar value of the firm's investment in period t. Let b(t,t) be
the book value in period t of a dollar invested in period t-x, and let
d(x,t) be the accounting depreciation charged against this investment. Then
the firm's accounting rate of return on assets in year t is given by cash
flow minus depreciation, all over the book value of assets:
J I(t-x)P(t)(T) d - I(t-T)P(t-r)d(t,t) dT
0 0
r(t) = ... - --. (3.3)
I(t-T)P(t-T)b(T,t) dT
0
In the simplest case prices are constant, so that P(t) = 1 for all t,
and that accounting depreciation is not time-dependent, so that b(T,t) =
b(T) and d(T,t) = d(X) for all and t. Then in order for ra to equal r for
all possible investment paths, (t), it follows from (3.3) that the
following equation be satisfied for all :
-d(T) = rb(t) - (T). (3.4)
As Hotelling (1925) first demonstrated and many others have independently
discovered since, (3.4) will be satisfied with b(O) = 1 and -d(X) = b'(T)
for all if and only if the asset's net book value is given by:
be(l) = (x)er(XT)d (3.S)
That is, depreciation is exact if the asset's book value is equal to the net
present value, computed at the economic rate of return, of its future net
cash flows. Then exact or economic depreciation is just the decline in book
value: de(l) = -d[be(T)]/dT.
11
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If prices are changing, equation (3.4) is replaced by
- P(t-T)d(t,t) = rP(t-T)b(T,t) - P(t)r(T). (3.6)
It is easy to see that (3.6) is satisfied for all t and and for any price
trajectory, P(t), if both Hotelling book values and Hotelling depreciation
deductions are adjusted to take into account inflation since the asset was
purchased:
b(t,t) = [P(t)/P(t-T)]be(t), (3.7a)
d(T,t) = [P(t)/P(t-T)]de(T). (3.7b)
[See Shalchi and Smith (1985) for an overview of the accounting literature
on methods for handling price changes in practice.]
To see what happens when exact depreciation and inflation adjustments
are not employed, it is convenient and traditional (but somewhat
unrealistic) to consider steady-state growth paths. Suppose prices rise at
rate i and investment grows at rate g, and define the Laplace transform,
f*(s), of any function of time, f(t), by
f*(s) = | f(t) e dt, (3.8)
0
where s is a constant [Stauffer (1971)]. Then, if depreciation is not time-
dependent, substitution in (3.3) and integration by parts allow the steady-
state accounting rate of return to be written as
ra g + i + T*(LL = (g+i) *(g) - d*(g+i) (3.9)
a b*(g+i) 1 - d*(g+i)
Since T*(r) = 1 by definition, equation (3.9) shows that when g = r the
accounting rate of return over-states the economic rate of return by exactly
the rate of inflation. It thus provides an unbiased estimate of the firm's
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nominal rate of return, which can be related to observed nominal interest
rates, for instance. In the usual case in which r > g and *(g) thus
exceeds one, ra exceeds g+i but may be greater or less than r+i in general
[Fisher and McGowan (1983)]. More rapid depreciation, perhaps taking the
form of expensing some of the initial investment, will reduce b*(g+i) and
d*(g+i). As long as *(g) > 1, it follows that the steady-state accounting
rate of return will be increased, even though both profits and assets will
be reduced.
In the very special case of exponential decay, (t) = (r+6)e 6t. Then
if b(T) = e- dt, where d and 6 may differ, equation (3.9) becomes
r = r + i + [i + (d-6)] + . (3.10)
Depreciation is exact if and only if d = 6.12 If d = 6, ra is equal to the
nominal rate of return, r+i, for very short-lived assets (6->-) and
approaches r+i(r/g) as asset longevity increases (6->0). In the usual case
in this example, at least, the steady-state bias is thus worse for longer-
lived assets. Similarly, as long as r > g, the bias is a decreasing
function of the firm's growth rate for fixed r.
It is clear that if accounting data are to be used to measure economic
profits, an inflation adjustment of the sort described by equations (3.8) is
appropriate. Bain (1951) recognized this point, and Stigler (1963) adjusted
his data for the effects of inflation. Few later authors have followed
suit. The analysis above indicates that failure to adjust for inflation
will induce bias if asset lifetimes or firm growth rates are correlated with
independent variables employed in profitability regressions.
11
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Outlays for advertising, research, and development are treated as
current expenses in conventional accounting, as are costs of producing firm-
specific human capital, even though all these outlays are expected to
produce future cash flows. The analysis above indicates that in the usual
case, these procedures tend to under-state firms' capital stocks (by
depreciating more rapidly than is economic) and over-state rates of return.
[See Section 4.4, below.]
Firms have some discretion over the accounting procedures they employ.
Studies of choices of accounting methods [Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981),
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983)1 consistently support
Stylized Fact 3.2: Large U.S. firms are more likely than small
ones to adopt accounting practices (like accelerated depreciation)
that lower current profits and increase steady-state accounting
rates of return.
Salamon (1985) argues that this phenomenon is the source of the correlation
between firm size and accounting profitabilty detected by Hall and Weiss
(1967) and some other authors. On the other hand, there is little support
for the existence of a correlation between accounting method choices and
industry concentration [Hagerman and Senbet (1976), Zmijewski and Hagerman
(1981), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983)].
All this suggests that empirical work on profitability should take
accounting biases seriously. In some cases it may be sufficient to use
alternative profitability measures that are likely to be biased in different
directions. Sometimes controls for accounting distortions can be included
among the regressors [Telser (1972, ch. 8), Salinger (1984)].
Alternatively, it may be possible to construct subsamples that differ in the
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likely direction or importance of accounting biases and to check for
stability among the subsamples [Demsetz (1979)]. Inflation-related
distortions can be corrected, at least approximately, on a fairly routine
basis.1 3 One can either exclude small corporations [Kilpatrick (1968)] or
attempt to adjust their accounting profits for excessive salaries [Stigler
(1963)]. A number of authors have attempted to adjust accounting data for
depreciation-related biases using the steady-state framework presented above
[e.g., Weiss (1969), Stauffer (1980), and Salamon (1985)]. Such adjustments
require considerable prior information, since the basic cash flow profile,
(T), cannot be directly estimated from aggregate accounting data.
3.4 Measures of Concentration
Two questions are of central importance here. Which measure of
concentration should be employed? And how should geographic and product
market boundaries be drawn?
A number of authors have presented axiomatic arguments for particular
concentration measures; see Hannah and Kay (1977), Curry and George (1983),
and Waterson (1984). Ideally, of course, the appropriate measure of
concentration should be derived from oligopoly theory. As Cowling and
Waterson (1976), among others, have observed, the H index of concentration,
equal to the sum of squared market shares, emerges as an endogenous
correlate of industry profitability in a Cournot oligopoly with (exogenous)
cost differences. Saving (1970) shows that concentration ratios (the
aggregate shares of domestic output or employment of, for instance, the four
or eight largest sellers) emerge similarly under alternative behavioral
assumptions. But the usual hypotheses of interest involve the effect of
concentration on behavior, and this argues against assuming the mode of
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behavior in advance. Stigler (1964) suggests that the H index provides a
reasonable measure of the ease of detecting cheating on collusive
agreements, but his arguments are not fully rigorous. In short, received
theory does not dictate the choice of concentration measure.
Most authors use concentration ratios because they are available in
government-supplied data and because many studies have found alternative
concentration measures to be highly correlated. But the choice among even
highly correlated concentration measures can affect the results obtained
[Kwoka (1981), Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1986)]. And concentration
ratios can be used to develop good estimates of the H index [Schmalensee
(1977), Michelini and Pickford (1985)], so that good estimates of other
measures may also be obtainable from published data.
Many authors have also simply used the market boundaries provided by
the compilers of official data. As antitrust cases make clear, it is often
difficult to choose among market definitions, and the official definitions
are often inappropriate. (Geographic market boundaries in official data
usually coincide with national boundaries, and product markets boundaries
are often based mainly on similarity of production technologies.) Bain
(1951) chose to drop from his sample those officially-defined "markets" for
which geographic or product boundaries did not seem sensible. This reduced
his sample size from 149 to 83. Most subsequent authors have been unwilling
to sacrifice so many degrees of freedom to obtain well-defined
markets. [But see Mann, Henning, and Meehan (1967).]
Most investigators (but not all) do drop catch-all industries with such
terms as "not elsewhere classified" or "miscellaneous" in their
descriptions. Some also adjust published concentration ratios for the
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existence of regional markets [see Shepherd (1974) and, especially, Weiss
and Pascoe (1986)]; others include dummy variables for products that are
rarely shipped long distances. Going in the other direction, it is common
to allow for foreign competiton by using the ratio of imports to domestic
production [Caves (1985)]. But Leitzinger and Tamor (1983) and others note
that if a product is already imported in non-trivial quantities, and if
there are no non-tariff barriers preventing an increase in imports, imports
can respond to domestic price changes, so that it may be better to work with
world markets (and world concentration) rather than domestic markets.
A few studies have considered the relation between buyer concentration
and seller profitability. The basic Bainian argument here is that buyers
who are large relative to the market should be able to destabilize collusion
in concentrated industries and push sellers' prices and profits down toward
competitive levels. On the other hand, if a seller faces few buyers because
he sells to a single concentrated industry and if the concentration-
collusion hypothesis is valid, downstream input demand may be less elastic
than it would be under competitive conditions, tending to offset increased
downstream bargaining power [Waterson (1980)]. Measurement of buyer
concentration has proven to be difficult in practice [compare Lustgarten
(1975), Guth, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1976), and Waterson (1980] and tightly
constrained by data availability.
3.5 Measures of Entry Barriers
The cross-section literature has taken three different approaches to
measuring the elements of market structure that Bain (1956) argued affected
the ability of established firms to prevent supra-normal profits being
eroded by entry. First, Bain (1956) performed a detailed structural
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analysis of each of the industries in his sample and classified them
according to the height of the barriers to entry in each. This approach is
labor-intensive, and subjective judgement must be used to integrate the
information on each industry into an overall estimate of the height of entry
barriers. For these reasons, only a few subsequent authors [notably Mann
(1966) and Qualls (1972); see also Palmer (1973)] have used this approach.
Second, Orr (1974a), using 1964-67 Canadian data, estimated a model of
the following sort:
AN = (r - r*), (3.11)
where AN is the gross increase in the number of sellers over the period, 
is a positive constant measuring the speed of adjustment, r is the average
observed profit rate, and r* is the profit rate at which entry would cease.
Orr (1974a) substituted for r* a linear function of variables designed to
measure the conditions of entry. In a later study, Orr (1974b) used the
estimated coefficients of this function to construct a measure of entry
barriers for each industry in his sample. Only Masson and Shaanan (1982)
and a few others have adopted this two-step approach.
Third, the most common approach to the treatment of entry barriers in
studies of profitability appears to be due to Comanor and Wilson (1967).
They investigated regression equations of the following form:
r = + B1(CON) + 2(BE1) + ... + N+1(BEN), (3.12)
where r is a measure of profitability, the 's are unknown coefficients, CON
is a measure of seller concentration, and the BE's are variables designed to
measure the structural determinants of entry barriers. BE variables that
appear in the literature generally correspond to three of the four possible
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sources of entry barriers discussed by Bain (1956): scale economies, capital
requirements, and product differentiation advantages of established
sellers. [Bain (1956) found the fourth possible source, absolute cost
advantages of established sellers, to be the least important in his sample.]
Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) and many others have measured the
importance of scale economies by the ratio of the output of a plant of
minimum efficient scale (MES) to the output of the market as a whole. [Only
Neumann, Bobel, and Haid (1979) and a few others have attempted to measure
minimum efficient firm scale.] MES is most commonly measured as either the
average size of the largest plants accounting for half the industry's output
or the size of the smallest of these plants. Both measures rest on the
assumption that the distribution of observed plant sizes relative to MES
does not vary systematically across industries, though Weiss (1976) and
Baldwin and Gorecki (1985) find evidence that this assumption is false. And
Davies (1980) shows that the differences between MES measures based on the
size distribution of existing plants and MES measures computed using either
survivorship methods or the interesting approach of Lyons (1980) tend to be
positive and to be positively correlated with concentration. [See also
Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator, Shrieves (1973) on MES measures.]
Caves, Khalizadeh-Shirazi, and Porter (1975) argued that even if MES is
large relative to the market, small-scale entry may be attractive unless the
cost penalty for operation at suboptimal scale is substantial. They compute
a cost disadvantage ratio (CDR) by taking the ratio of value-added per
worker in plants below MES to that in larger plants, and they propose
multiplying the MES/market ratio by a zero/one dummy variable that equals
one only when CDR is small. [Chappel and Cottle (1985) use firm-level data
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in this fashion.] This procedure tends to overstate the cost disadvantages
of small plants, since capital/labor ratios typically rise with scale [Caves
and Pugel (1980)] -- but CDR's above unity are not uncommon in U.S. data.
It is unclear why a zero/one specification is preferable to some sort of
continuous interactive form. Some studies employ a CDR-based dummy variable
by itself in linear equations; the theoretical rationale is not apparent.
Bain (1956) argued that a potential entrant might be detered if the
capital requirements of entry were large in absolute terms. The hypothesis
that capital markets are seriously imperfect, on which Bain rested his
argument, does not now command much respect. But recent theory implies that
entry will be detered if a large fraction of entry costs are sunk (i.e.,
cannot be recovered upon exit), and the relative importance of sunk cost may
be correlated with the absolute level of capital requirements [see Kessides
(1986)]. Capital requirements are often handled in the Comanor-Wilson
(1967) framework by including among the regressors a variable measuring the
capital cost of a plant of minimum efficient scale. Some authors multiply
this quantity by a CDR-based dummy variable.
Finally, Bain (1956) attributed the greatest importance to roduct
differentiation advantages of established sellers. Comanor and Wilson
(1967) introduced the idea of using an industry's advertising/sales ratio to
measure this structural feature; they and others have also employed
advertising spending per firm for this purpose. [Cowling (1976) and Porter
(1976a) compare these measures.] Some studies have also used research and
development spending as a percentage of sales or patents/sales, and Neumann,
Bobel, and Haid (1985) used the ratio of registered trademarks to owners'
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equity. All of these variables are basically measures of conduct and thus
clearly endogenous in the long run.
4. Profitability
Bain (1951) began the literature considered in this section by arguing
that if high seller concentration facilitates collusion, firms in highly
concentrated industries should on average earn supra-competitive profits.
He found support for this hypothesis using data on leading U.S. firms in the
1936-40 period.14 In a second seminal study, Bain (1956, esp. pp. 190-191)
argued that both high concentration and high barriers to entry were
necessary to produce excess profits in long-run equilibrium. He found
support for this interactive hypothesis using data on leading U.S. firms in
1936-40 and 1947-51. Bain (1951, 1956) is still worth reading today for his
careful handling of data and his thoughtful discussion of many of the
hypotheses, problems, and results that have dominated the subsequent
literature.
Section 4.1 discusses some descriptive statistics on differences in
measured profitability, and Section 4.2 considers control variables that
have been employed in cross-section studies of profitability levels.
Sections 4.3--4.5 present the main results that have been obtained in these
studies, and Section 4.6 discusses studies concerned with the variability of
profits.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics on Profitability
Are many firms sufficiently profitable as to suggest large percentage
differences between price and average cost? Analysis of U.S. data on
accounting rates of return [Alberts (1984)] and Tobin's q's [Salinger
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(1984)], along with the generally small estimates of monopoly welfare losses
based on cross-section differences in profit rates, imply
Stylized Fact 4.1: Differences among observed accounting rates of
return and market/book ratios in the U.S. are generally too low to
be easily reconciled with the existence of textbook monopolies.
The 1936-40 profitability data reported in Bain (1951) support this
observation. The average after-tax rate of return on equity in Bain's 20
unconcentrated industries is 6.9%. If this is the competitive rate of
return, rc, any other firm's excess after-tax return on equity is given by
r-r (- ER-C) = [(1-t)R][RC] (4.1)
where r is the actual after-tax rate of return on equity, is the corporate
tax rate, R is revenue, C is total cost (including normal profit), and E is
owners' equity. Data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service Statistics of
Income. 1938 indicate that [(1-T)R/E] averages about 1.12 for manufacturing
firms in Bain's sample. Thus an observed r of 16% corresponds to a markup
over total cost [(R-C)/R] of about 8.1% [=(16.0-6.9)/1.12], which would be
chosen by a monopoly facing a demand elasticity of about 12. A firm with
such an elastic demand curve has little monopoly power, and yet only 3 of
Bain's 22 concentrated industries had r's above 16%. The highest r in
Bain's sample was for "aircraft and parts", an industry far out of
equilibrium in the 1930's; it corresponds to a demand elasticity of about 8.
On the other hand, Mueller (1977, 1986) and Connolly and Schwartz
(1985), using both accounting rates of return and the EVR, find that profit
rates of large U.S. firms do not converge over time to a common mean [see
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also Stigler (1963)], and Odagiri and Yamawaki (1986) and Geroski and
Jacquemin (1986) report similar results for large Japanese and UK firms,
respectively. Some studies of other countries (discussed below) cannot
reject convergence in the limit, but none find rapid convergence.
Stylized Fact 4.2: Accounting profitability differences among
large firms tend to persist for long periods.
Connolly and Schwartz (1985) find that highly profitable U.S. firms regress
toward the mean noticeably more slowly than others.
There appear to be important international differences in profit
dynamics. Geroski and Jacquemin (1986) cannot reject the null hypothesis
that profitabilities of large French and German firms converge to a common
value in the limit, and Odagiri and Yamawaki (1986) find more dispersion in
asymptotic profit rates in the US than in Japan. These studies also argue
that rates of convergence are more rapid in Japan than in the US and more
rapid in France and Germany than in the UK. Odagiri and Yamawaki (1987)
find the US to have the largest asymptotic differences and the slowest
convergence in a larger set of countries.
The importance of industry differences in the determination of
profitability has been studied by Gort and Singamsetti (1976), using firm-
level data for the U.S. in 1970, and by Schmalensee (1985), Scott and Pascoe
(1986), Ross (1986), and Kessides (1987) using U.S. Federal Trade Commission
Line of Business data for the mid-1970's. All employed dummy variables for
each industry in the sample, and all support
Stylized Fact 4.3: At the firm or business unit level in the U.S.,
industry characteristics account for only about 10-25% of the
cross-section variation in accounting rates of return.1 5
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This suggests that Stylized Fact 4.2 reflects more than industry-specific
accounting biases and stable mixes of firms' activities, though it does not
rule out persistent differences in growth rates or accounting practices as
sources of long-lived differences.16 Recent work by Cubbin and Geroski
(1987) with a panel of 217 large U.K. firms over the 1951-77 period finds
that changes in firms' profit rates are not well-explained by industry
averages; their estimates reveal important firm-specific dynamic effects.
On the other hand, Schmalensee (1985) found that industry characteristics
accounted for about 75% of the variation in industry-average accounting
rates of return, suggesting that the industry is at least a valid unit of
analysis.
Gort and Singamsetti (1976) attributed the variation in rates of return
not explained by industry dummy variables to firm characteristics. But
Schmalensee (1985) found that knowing a firm's profitability in one industry
provided no information on the likely profitability of its other
businesses. This is consistent with Mueller's (1986) finding that the only
detectable impact of merger activity in a sample of large U.S. firms during
the 1950-72 period was to hasten the regression of acquiring firms'
profitability toward the mean. Recently, however, Scott and Pascoe (1986)
and Kessides (1987) have detected significant firm effects in the FTC Line
of Business data.
4.2 Control Variables
Many control variables have been employed in cross-section studies of
profitability. [Ravenscraft (1983) and Bothwell, Cooley, and Hall (1984)
provide long lists.] Following Comanor and Wilson (1967), many authors have
used some measure of recent sales growth in order to control for the effects
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of disequilibrium. 1 7 This variable almost always "works" statistically
[see, especially, Bothwell, Cooley, and Hall (1984)]:
Stylized Fact 4.4: Recent growth in revenue is positively
correlated with measured profitability.
Bradburd and Caves (1982) argue that only unanticipated growth should affect
profitability, but they find support for this hypothesis only among
unconcentrated U.S. industries in 1972. Liebowitz (1982b) examines the
dynamic effects of several alternative measures of disequilibrium on the
rate of return on assets in U.S. data for the 1960's. He concludes that
revenue growth over a one- or two-year period is the best available
measure. (Growth rates over longer periods may serve as crude controls for
growth-related accounting biases.) Liebowitz (1982b) also finds.that his
measures of disequilibrium are-generally uncorrelated with concentration, so
that estimates of the concentration-profitability relation may not be biased
by failure to control for disequilibrium.
Studies using the PCM to measure profitability generally employ the
capital/revenue ratio as a control. The coefficient of this variable is
usually plausible and statistically significant. But significant negative
estimates have been reported by a number of authors [e.g., Ornstein (1975),
Liebowitz (1982a), Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b)]
especially when U.S. data for the 1970's are employed.
Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1981) and Harris (1986) present evidence that
PCM's are lower in industries with more elastic demand, and Bradburd (1982)
finds that PCM's are lower in producer goods industries selling inputs that
are important to downstream buyers (and for which demand elasticities should
accordingly be high). But Bradburd finds no support for the plausible
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hypothesis that demand elasticity is negatively related to PCM only in
concentrated industries.
Finally, a number of authors have attempted to control for differences
in risk, using a variety of measures and obtaining a variety of significant
[Bothwell and Keeler (1976), Neumann, Bobel, and Haid (1979, 1985), Harris
(1984, 1986)], insignificant [Grabowski and Mueller (1978), Bothwell,
Cooley, and Hall (1984), Hirschey (1985)], and perverse [Thomadakis (1977),
Mueller (1986)] results. This state of affairs is somewhat surprising a
priori, since investors must generally be compensated for bearing risk.
Part of the problem may be that firms with inherently risky demand find it
optimal to charge a lower price, all else equal, in order to maximize their
market value [Harris (1986)].
4.3 Concentration and Profitability
Weiss (1974) examined 46 studies that had been published by the early
1970's and noted that 42 of them had found a positive relation between
concentration and profitability. [See also the reviews by Collins and
Preston (1968) and Phlips (1971).] He took this as providing strong support
for the concentration-collusion hypothesis, though he did note that the
concentration-profitability relation was generally statistically weak.
[See, for instance, Stigler (1963) and Collins and Preston (1968).]
The economic effects of concentration implied by the early literature
were also generally small. Employing equation (4.1) as above, for instance,
Bain's (1951) results imply an average markup over long-run cost of only
4.6% in the concentrated industries in his preferred sample. For other
samples (see his Table 3), implied markups varied from 0.9% to 3.2%, and the
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corresponding profitability differences were generally statistically
insignificant.
Weiss (1971) noted that Bain's (1956) hypothesis called for interactive
(concentration x barriers) specifications, but surprisingly few authors have
employed models of this sort. Mann (1966) and Qualls (1972) found support
for Bain's hypothesis in U.S. data, as did Jenny and Weber (1976) in French
data. Orr (1974b) and Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980), however, found that
interactive specifications did not perform noticeably better than simple
linear models with Canadian data. Salinger (1984) argued that Bain's
hypothesis implied that (3.12) should be replaced by interactive regression
models of the form
r = 0 + CR[B1(BE1) + ... + N(BEN)] + N+1(G) + ... (4.2)
where G is a measure of past sales growth, and the ellipsis indicates
additional variables discussed below. Salinger found that such models had
essentially no ability to explain variations in the market/book ratios of
large U.S. firms in 1976. Thus the relevant literature does not provide
strong support for Bain's interactive hypothesis.
Using linear models, like equation (3.12), a number of studies
published after Weiss (1971, 1974) wrote found positive relations between
domestic concentration and profitability; these include studies of Japan
[Caves and Uekusa (1976)], Pakistan [White (1974)], France [Jenny and Weber
(1976)], West Germany [Neumann, Bobel and Haid (1979, 1985)] and several
studies of U.S. manufacturing industries. 1 8 Gilbert (1984) concluded that
analyses of U.S. banking markets support the existence of a positive --
though economically trivial -- relation.
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But many later studies of U.S. data, particularly those using
multivariate specifications, found no statistically significant linear
relation between domestic concentration and profitability, even when market
share (see Section 4.5) was not included among the regressors.l 9 Several
studies [Porter (1976a), Grabowski and Mueller (1978), Connolly and Hirschey
(1984), Hirschey (1985)] reported statistically significant negative
concentration coefficients with U.S. data. And, while Weiss (1971, 1974)
noted the tendency of the concentration-profitability relation to weaken
during inflationary periods [see, for instance, Stigler (1963)], Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b) found that this relation essentially
vanished in the U.S. during 1970's. [See also Scott and Pascoe (1986) and
Schmalensee (1987).]
Non-U.S. data have also produced negative results. Phlips (1971)
failed to detect a concentration-profitability relation in French, Belgian,
or Italian data, and Jacquemin, de Ghellinck, and Huveneers (1980) confirmed
his results for Belgium. With the exception of the theoretically
interesting study of the relation between changes in the H-index of
concentration and changes in profitability by Cowling and Waterson (1976),
most studies of the U.K. have failed to find a positive linear relation
between concentration and profitability [Hart and Morgan (1977), Hart and
Clarke (1980), Clarke (1984)]. And the Cowling-Waterson (1976) results are
apparently not robust to changes in the sample of industries studied [Hart
and Morgan (1977)].
Most of these studies adopt specifications in which one or another
concentration ratio is linearly related to profitability. Alternative
concentration measures and functional forms sometimes yield stronger
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results.20 Stigler (1964), for instance, found the H-index outperformed the
four-firm concentration ratio. Most other studies have not detected sharp
differences among these and other frequently discussed (and highly
correlated) measures. Kwoka (1979, 1981), however, found that the shares of
the two leading firms are noticeably more closely related to industry PCM's
than broader concentration ratios. [See also Kwoka and Ravenscraft (1986).]
Bain (1951) argued that his data seemed to show the existence of a
critical concenr ation ratio, above which profitability increased
discontinuously. Changes in concentration above or below this level had no
discernible effect. A number of studies using U.S. data have found some
support for a relation of this form [Dalton and Penn (1976), White (1976),
Kwoka (1979); but see Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1986)]. In the most
sophisticated study of this sort, Bradburd and Over (1982) find evidence for
two critical levels. If concentration was previously low, they find that
profits do not increase with increases in concentration until the leading
four firms account for 68% of industry sales. But if concentration was
previously high, profits don't drop until the four-firm ratio falls below
46%. Finally, however, Geroski's (1981) work indicates that the critical
concentration ratio hypothesis fares no better in U.K. data than the
hypothesis of a linear relation.
At the very least, these mixed results make it clear that a researcher
cannot expect a strong, positive concentration-profitability relation to
leap out from cross-section data: 21
Stylized Fact 4.5: The relation, if any, between seller
concentration and profitability is weak statistically, and the
estimated concentration effect is usually small. The estimated
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relation is unstable over time and space and vanishes in many
multivariate studies.
Several studies have found a negative linear relation between the
imports/consumption ratio and profitability.22 But, even if foreign
competition can erode domestic market power, the long-run profitability of a
competitive industry should be unaffected by imports. This argues for an
interactive specification [Pugel (1980a), Caves (1985)]. And several
authors have indeed found that the negative impact of imports on domestic
profitability is stronger when domestic concentration is high.23
Stylized Fact 4.6: The ratio of imports to domestic consumption
tends to be negatively correlated with the profitability of
domestic sellers, especially when domestic concentration is high.
Pugel (1980a) also finds that import penetration has a stronger negative
relation with domestic profitability when conventional measures of entry
barriers are high. The success of interactive specifications involving
import penetration contrasts sharply with the (concentration x barriers)
work discussed above. 24
The arguments in the preceding paragraph suggest that increases in
tariff protection should have a positive structural impact on long-run
profits only in concentrated industries. But, while Round (1983) finds an
empirical relation of this sort for Australia, Bloch (1974b) finds none for
Canada. A number of authors have employed the ratio of exports to domestic
production in profitability regression. It is hard to provide a convincing
theoretical rationale for this specification Caves (1985)], and significant
coefficients of both signs have been reported [compare Neumann, Bobel, and
Haid (1979, 1985) with Geroski (1982) and Martin (1983)], along with many
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insignificant results. Finally, Leitzinger and Tamor (1983) find that a
(weak) proxy for world market -concentration strongly outperforms
U.S. domestic concentration for a sample of widely-shipped goods in 1972,
and Yamawaki (1986) finds that the profit margin on Japanese exports is
positively related to concentration in the corresponding U.S. industry.
Lustgarten (1975) found that buyer concentration was negatively related
to PCM's in 1963 U.S. data. LaFrance (1979) noted that buyer concentration
is theoretically irrelevant under perfect competition and found evidence
that the negative effect of buyer concentration increases with seller
concentration in Lustgarten's data. But Guth, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1976)
argued that Lustgarten's measure of buyer concentration was flawed and that
correcting the flaws eliminated his results. And Ravenscraft (1983) and
Martin (1983) report significant positive coefficients of buyer
concentration in U.S. data for the mid-1970's. In the most theoretically
sophisticated study of buyer concentration, Waterson (1980), using data on
changes between 1963 and 1968 in the U.K. and measures of buyer
concentration based on the H-index, finds evidence supporting both a
negative effect of buyer concentration on profits and a positive effect of
downstream margins. But Bradburd (1982) finds that downstream margins have
a negative effect on PCM's in 1972 U.S. data. It seems fair to conclude
that no robust relation has yet emerged from studies of buyer concentration.
4.4 Entry Barriers and Profitability
Since the MES/market measure of scale economies and the MES-based
measure of capital requirements are highly correlated with each other [and
with seller concentration; see, for instance, Comanor and Wilson (1967)],
both rarely if ever have statistically significant coefficients in
III
39
profitability regressions. It is common, however, for either scale
economies [e.g., Ornstein (1972)] or capital requirements [e.g., Comanor and
Wilson (1967, 1974)] to have a significant negative coefficient. Most of
the studies cited in Section 4.3 support
Stylized Fact 4.7: Measures of scale economies or capital
requirements tend to be positively correlated with industry-level
accounting profitability.
Studies using CDR-based dummy variables [e.g., Kwoka (1979)] generally
obtain stronger results. The robustness of the relation described by
Stylized Fact 4.7 is somewhat surprising; simple models of entry deterrence
suggest that the structural MES/market coefficient should be at most equal
to the competitive rate of return [Schmalensee (1981)], implying an effect
small enough to be difficult to detect in the data.
Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974) first reported a strong, positive
relation between the advertising/sales ratio and industry-level
profitability (measured as the after-tax rate of return on equity) for
U.S. consumer goods industries. This finding has proven to be unusually
robust.25
Stylized Fact 4.8: In broad samples of manufacturing industries
producing consumer goods, advertising intensity is positively
related to industry-average accounting profitability. 2 6
A comparison of the least-squares and fixed effects estimates reported for
consumer goods industries by Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b),
based on U.S. panel data covering the 1958-1981 period, indicates that long-
run average advertising intensity is positively related to average
II]
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profitability, as the cross-section studies indicate, but year-to-year
changes in these quantities are negatively related across industries.
The results of Bradburd and Caves (1982) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1986a) [see also Cattin and Wittink (1976)] imply that in producer
goods industries, advertising intensity is negatively related to
profitability in both the long and short runs. Advertising is not the
dominant component selling costs in these industries [Weiss, Pascoe, and
Martin (1983)], so that the measurement error involved in using advertising
as a proxy for selling costs may bias the advertising coefficient
substantially toward zero.
Salinger (1984) and Hirschey (1985) obtain significant positive
coefficients for both advertising intensity and research and development
intensity with data on U.S. firms, and Stonebraker (1976) reports similar
results at the industry level. Grabowski and Mueller (1978) and Connolly
and Hirschey (1984) provide further support at the industry level and also
report a significant and robust negative relation between profitability and
the product of concentration and R&D intensity. Despite the contrary
results obtained by Martin (1983), there seems enough evidence to assert
Stylized Fact 4.9: In broad samples of U.S. manufacturing
industries, research and development intensity is positively
related to profitability. The relation may weaken or change sign
when concentration is high.
Two alternatives to the Bainian interpretation of Stylized Fact 4.8
have been widely discussed r[Comanor and Wilson (1979)]; both also apply in
principle to the first part of Stylized Fact 4.9. The endogeneity
interpretation is based standard models of optimal advertising spending
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[Schmalensee (1972, 1976)]. These imply that the farther is price above
marginal cost, the more profitable is an additional sale, and the higher is
the optimal advertising/sales ratio. Thus the advertising-profitabilty
correlation may reflect differences in the intensity of price competition
not explained by other variables included in profitability regressions.
Vernon and Nourse (1973), using a sample of large U.S. firms in the
1960's, found that industry-average advertising/sales ratios were more
strongly correlated with firm profitability than were the firms' own ratios
[see also Mueller (1986)], but Schmalensee (1976) showed that this was
consistent in principle with the endogeneity interpretation. The arguments
of Section 2 imply that the robustness of the advertising-profitability
relation to the use of simultaneous equations methods [Comanor and Wilson
(1974), Strickland and Weiss (1976), Martin (1979a, 1979b), Pagoulatos and
Sorenson (1981)] does not effectively rebut this interpretation either.
The second alternative interpretation is that the advertising-
profitability correlation is simply an accounting artifact. The argument
can be developed using the steady-state framework developed in Section 3.2,
neglecting inflation for simplicity. [See also Weiss (1969) and Demsetz
(1979).] Suppose that an investment of $1 in physical capital produces a
cash flow of ce- 6 T when it is T periods old, where c is a constant, as long
as the ratio of the firm's "goodwill stock", which is increased by
advertising and depreciates exponentially at a rate X > 6, to its physical
capital is (at least) a. Thus the firm must invest $a in advertising when
it invests $1 in physical capital and must support that investment with
advertising spending equal to $a(X-6)e 6 T when it is periods old. Then if




If the firm is growing steadily at rate g, its advertising spending at
time t must equal I(t)a(g+X)/(g+6), where I(t) is investment in physical
capital at time t. Then if advertising is expensed and physical capital is
depreciated at a rate d, the firm's steady-state accounting rate of return
on assets, ra, will be given by
ra - r = (d-6)[1 [+ A (4.3)
where A = a(g+X)(g+d)/(g+6) is the ratio of advertising to the accounting
value of the firm's physical capital.
The first term on the right of (4.3) [which also appears in (3.10)] is
the bias due to inappropriate depreciation of physical capital. The second
term, which is positive when r > g (the usual case), measures the bias due
to expensing advertising. This term is large, indicating substantially
over-stated profitability, if advertising is important (A is large), if it
depreciates slowly (X is small), or if r much larger than g.
Weiss (1969) dealt with this second bias by adjusting accounting rates
of return using (essentially) equation (4.3) and assuming an advertising
depreciation rate of 30% per year. This adjustment did not remove the
advertising-profitability relation. [Grabowski and Mueller (1978)
depreciated both advertising and R&D and obtained similar results.] When
Bloch (1974a) used a 5% depreciation rate, however, the relation vanished.
Equation (4.3) explains the difference: the lower is the depreciation rate,
X, the larger is the implied adjustment to the profitability of advertising-
intensive firms. Time-series studies of advertising and demand generally
suggest that Weiss' assumption is more plausible [Lambin (1976), Comanor and
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Wilson (1979), Assmus, Farley and Lehmann (1984)], but the issue is not
settled.
Demsetz (1979) observed that (4.3) implies that for any X, the
importance of the accounting bias is directly related to (r-g) and thus
approximately related to (ra-g). Dividing his sample according to the
latter variable, Demsetz found a positive relation between the rate of
return on equity and advertising intensity only when (ra-g) was large. In
another indirect test of the accounting artifact interpretation, Salinger
(1984) included measures of the ratio of advertising and R&D capital
[computed as in Grabowski and Mueller (1978)] to the book value of assets in
equation (4.2). He argued that linear relations between these variables and
the market/book ratio are implied by the accounting artifact interpretation,
while Bain's (1956) hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient for
interaction terms involving the products of these variables and seller
concentration. He found strong linear relations and insignificant
coefficients of the interaction terms. On the other hand, the finding that
firm profitability is more closely related to industry advertising intensity
than to the firm's own advertising/sales ratio [Vernon and Nourse (1973),
Mueller (1986)] appears inconsistent with the accounting artifact
interpretation. [See also the discussion of advertising and entry in
Section 6.3.]
Moreover, neither the endogeneity interpretation nor the accounting
artifact interpretation imply that the advertising-profitability relation
should vary with market structure or type of advertising, and numerous
variations of this sort have been reported. As noted above, the relation is
apparently different in consumer- and producer-good industries. Boyer
__l__i_l________
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(1974) found a negative advertising-profitability relation among
U.S. local service industries, and White (1976) found a positive relation
only in unconcentrated U.S. manufacturing industries. Porter (1976a, 1976b,
1979) analyzed consumer good industries in the U.S. and reported a positive
advertising-profitability relation for convenience goods (for which buyers
do not rely heavily on retailers for information) but not for non-
convenience goods, for network television but not for other media
[consistent with Boyer (1974), newspaper advertising was negatively related
to profitability], and for leading firms but not for followers. All of this
suggests that the endogeneity and accounting artifact interpretations are
incomplete, but the reported results also seem inconsistent with the view
that advertising is always associated with entry barriers.
4.5 Intra-Industry Differences
In a widely-cited early study of firm-level data, Hall and Weiss (1967)
found that absolute firm size was positively related to profitability in
U.S. manufacturing, even after controlling for industry characteristics, and
Caves and Uekusa (1976) reported a similar relation for all but the largest
Japanese firms. But a number of studies have failed to replicate this
finding in U.S. data [e.g., Ornstein (1972), Imel, Behr, and Helmberger
(1972), and Vernon and Nourse (1973)1,27 and negative firm size effects have
been reported in studies of France [Jenny and Weber (1976)], West Germany
[Neumann, Bobel, and Haid (1979)], and large European and Japanese firms
[Jacquemin and Saez (1976)]. [See also Salamon (1985).] There seems to be
no support for a general relation between absolute firm size and
profitability.
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Gale (1972) found a strong positive relation between the weighted
average market share and profitability of large U.S. firms in the 1963-1967
period. This seems inconsistent with the general view that economies of
scale in most industries are exhausted at output levels corresponding to low
market shares [Scherer (1980, ch. 4)]. But Gale's results are consistent
with the existence of long-lived efficiency differences among firms in the
same industry, with more efficient firms attaining larger equilibrium market
shares.2 8 And Demsetz (1973, 1974) argued that efficiency differences
provide an alternative explanation for the positive relation between
concentration and profitability that many investigators had detected. [See
Mancke (1974) for a related formal analysis stressing differences in luck.]
To illustrate this argument, consider a market in which firms produce a
homogeneous product under constant returns to scale but have different unit
costs. [This development follows Schmalensee (1987); see also Cowling and
Waterson (1976) and Clarke, Davies, and Waterson (1984).] Let us use the
conjectural variation formalism to summarize conduct and assume that each
firm acts as if it expects its rivals to increase their aggregate output by
X in response to a unit increase in its own output. Higher values of X
correspond to less intense rivalry. It can be shown that in long-run
equilibrium, the accounting rate of return on assets (neglecting accounting
biases) of a typical firm i is given by
ri = P + [(l+X)/Eki] MSi, (4.4)
where p is the competitive rate of return, E is the market elasticity of
demand, ki is firm i's capital/revenue ratio, and MSi is firm i's market
share. If ki = k for all i, the industry-average rate of return is given by




where H is the H-index of concentration. Concentration is endogenous here;
it is determined by exogenous cost differences and industry conduct (X).
[Donsimoni, Geroski, and Jacquemin (1984) discuss implications of this
point.]
One way of interpreting Bain's (1951) concentration-collusion
hypothesis is that X in this model should be positively related to H across
industries. And one way of interpreting Demsetz' (1973, 1974) argument is
that even if X is the same for all firms in all industries, (4.5) predicts a
positive correlation between concentration and profitability across
industries. In fact, since E and k vary across industries, it predicts a
weak correlation and is thus broadly consistent with the mixed results
reported in Section 4.3. The rest of this subsection focuses on work aimed
at distinguishing between these two views of the world. [See also Brozen
(1982).]
Demsetz' view implies that only leading firms, with efficiency
advantages, should earn supra-normal profits in concentrated industries.
And Bain (1951, p. 320) noted that in his data, "Smaller firms tended to
fare about the same regardless of industry concentration; the dominant firms
in general had earnings rates that were positively influenced by
concentration." Subsequent work by Collins and Preston (1969), Carter
(1978), Porter (1979), Chappel and Cottle (1985), and others [see also Weiss
(1974)] also supports
Stylized Fact 4.10: The profitability of industry leaders in
U.S. manufacturing may be positively related to concentration; the
profitability of firms with small market shares is not.2 9
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The weak results obtained by many industry-level studies (Stylized Fact 4.5)
may thus reflect in part averaging over small and large firms, with the
presence of the former tending to mask a positive concentration --
profitability relation involving the latter.
This pattern may not generally hold outside the U.S.. While Round
(1975) finds a positive relation between concentration and differences
between the profitability of large and small firms in Australia, Clarke,
Davies and Waterson (1984) find no support for Stylized Fact 4.10 in the
U.K., and Neumann, Bobel, and Haid (1979) report exactly contrary results
for West Germany.
Two non-Demsetzian interpretations of Stylized Fact 4.10 have been
offered. Bain (1956, p. 191) argued that the observed profitability of
small firms is generally contaminated by failure to take full advantge of
scale economies. Porter (1979), who found a number of differences between
profitability equation estimates for industry leaders and for smaller firms,
interpreted his findings in terms of the theory of strategic groups. This
theory, which stresses barriers to mobility that prevent other sellers from
imitating the industry leaders, is supported by Newman's (1978) findings
that the concentration-profitability relation holds only when leading firms
are in the same businesses and that heterogeneity along this dimension
lowers profits only in concentrated industries. [See also Oster (1982).]
Weiss (1974) argued that the most natural way to discriminate between
the Bain and Demsetz views was to include both concentration and market
share in the same equation. Results with specifications of this sort
strongly support the following:3 0
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Stylized Fact 4.11: In samples of U.S. firms or business units
that include many industries, market share is strongly correlated
with profitability; the coefficient of concentration is generally
negative or insignificant in regressions including market share.
On the other hand, Demsetz' argument implies [see equation (4.4)] that
a positive intra-industry relation between profitability and market share
should generally hold in U.S. manufacturing. But, though positive relations
are somewhat more common than negative ones in most periods [but see
Schmalensee's (1987) results for 1972], intra-industry studies of the
U.K. by Clarke, Davies, and Waterson (1984) and of the U.S. by several
authors unanimously support the following: 3 1
Stylized Fact 4.12: Within particular manufacturing industries,
profitability is not generally strongly related to market share.
These latter results suggest that estimates supporting Stylized Fact 4.11
may be dominated be a small number of industries with unusually strong
positive relations between share and profitability. The results of Ross
(1986) and, especially, Kessides (1987) tend to support this suggestion.
Collins and Preston (1969) find that differences between the
profitability of large and small firms are not related to subsequent changes
in concentration, as the Demsetz view would suggest. Salinger (1984) argues
that, while Bain predicts that only (concentration x barriers) interaction
terms should be positively related to market/book ratios, Demsetz predicts a
positive relation involving concentration by itself. Salinger's data are
inconsistent with both predictions.
Gale (1972) found that the impact of profitability on market share was
positively related to concentration, suggesting that X in (4.4) is an
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increasing function of concentration. But this finding has not proven
robust.32 Comanor and Wilson (1974, ch. 10) argued the gap between the
profits of large and small firms in consumer goods industries tended to be
positively related to the industry advertising-sales ratio. The results of
Caves and Pugel (1980), Ravenscraft (1983), Mueller (1986), and Schmalensee
(1987) also support: 33
Stylized Fact 4.13: The estimated effect of market share on
profitability in U.S. manufacturing industries is positively
related to the industry advertising/sales ratio.
Finally, recent work by Martin (1983), Kwoka and Ravenscraft (1986),
Mueller (1986), Cotterill (1986), and Scott and Pascoe (1986) suggests a
variety of complex firm-specific intra-industry effects not easily
explicable by either Bain's or Demsetz' hypotheses. [See also the
discussion of Stylized Fact 4.2, above.] While the industry may be a valid
unit of analysis, systematic differences among firms deserve more attention
than they have generally received.
4.6 Variability of Profit Rates
Stigler (1963) hypothesized that, since one would expect effective
collusion to occur only in some concentrated industries, the cross-section
variance of profit rates should be higher in concentrated than
unconcentrated industries. He found only weak support for this hypothesis.
But his data did suggest that the intertemporal variance in profit rates was
lower in more concentrated industries. This finding is apparently at odds
with the view that collusion/warfare cycles are not uncommon when
concentration is high. Subsequent work has focused on the intertemporal
50
variance, but no clear picture of the industry-level correlates of earnings
variability have emerged. Perhaps this is because most studies have not
attempted to control for differences in the variability of exogenous
disturbances.
Confirming Stigler (1963), Gort and Singamsetti (1976) and Rhoades and
Rutz (1982) find negative relations between concentration and the
intertemporal variance in studies of U.S. manufacturing and banking,
respectively, and Sullivan (1978) finds a negative relation for
U.S. manufacturing firms between concentration and the beta-coefficient
measure of specific risk. But Round (1983) and Clarke (1984) report (weak)
positive relations between concentration and intertemporal variability in
data on Australia and the U.K., respectively, and Shepherd (1974) reports a
positive relation for a sample of large U.S. firms.
Winn (1977) finds that the simple correlation between concentration and
profit variability is negative in U.S. data, but concentration has a
positive, significant coefficient in a regression that includes a control
for firm size [see also Daskin (1983)]. This implies a strong negative
relation between firm size and the intertemporal variance. Such a relation
has been reported by Jacquemin and Saez (1986) and other authors and is
consistent with the strong negative relation generally observed between firm
size and the cross-section variance [e.g., Hall and Weiss (1967)]:
Stylized Fact 4.14: Firm size tends to be negatively related to the
intertemporal and cross-section variability of profit rates.
Of course the intertemporal variance is not necessarily a good measure
of riskiness. Geroski and Jacquemin (1986) find that large UK firms tend to
have larger intertemporal variances than large French and German firms, but
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a smaller residual variances in regressions involving lagged profitability,
and the residual variance is the better measure of the extent to which
profits are unpredictable. Lev (1983) considered autoregressive models of
both sales and accounting profits and found a strong negative relation
between firm size and the residual variance, along with a positive relation
between barriers to entry [as assessed by Palmer (1973)] and the serial
correlation of sales and earnings. This last result is broadly consistent
with the finding of Lustgarten and Thomadakis (1980) that the stock market
reponds more strongly to changes in accounting earnings announced by firms
in concentrated industries, presumably because earnings changes are expected
to be more persistent in those industries.
On the other hand, the profits of concentrated industries are not
particularly stable over the business cycle, at least in the U.S. [Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b, 1987)], Germany [Neumann, Bobel, and
Haid (1985)], Japan [Odagiri and Yamashita (1987)]. The U.S. results in
particular strongly support
Stylized Fact 4.15: Price-cost margins tend to be more strongly
pro-cyclical in more concentrated industries.
5. Prices and Costs
Instead of studying profitability, some authors have chosen to analyze
its basic components: price and cost. Section 5.1 surveys cross-section




Studies that compare price levels among geographically separated
markets in the same industry are immune to the serious accounting problems
that affect profitability studies, and one can expect that omitted
market-specific variables are less important (and thus less likely to cause
large biases) when attention is focused on a single industry. On the other
hand, biased results may be obtained if adequate controls for exogenous
determinants of cost are not included. The relation between concentration
and price has been studied in numerous markets.3 4 This work generally
provides strong support for:3 5
Stylized Fact 5.1: In cross-section comparisons involving markets
in the same industry, seller concentration is positively related
to the level of price.
Price studies that search for critical concentration ratios [Geithman,
Marvel, and Weiss (1981), Thompson (1984)] obtain mixed results. And while
some authors find a small concentration effect [e.g., Stigler (1964),
Gilbert (1984), Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985)], others find quite large
effects [e.g., Marvel (1978), Thompson (1984)].
The relation between concentration and price seems much more robust
statistically than that between concentration and profitability. Since
studies of price have fewer obvious weaknesses than studies of
profitability, Stylized Fact 5.1 seems to provide the best evidence in
support of the concentration-collusion hypothesis. 3 6
Bloch (1974b) and Hazledine (1980) found that higher Canadian tariffs
raised the ratio of Canadian to U.S. prices only when Canadian concentration
was high. Nickell and Metcalf (1978) found that the ratio of the prices of
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proprietary to store-brand grocery products rose with seller concentration
and the advertising/sales ratio in U.K. data. They interpreted store-brand
prices as a control for costs, but their results also seem consistent with
inter-brand differences in quality and consumer information.
Lamm (1981) reports that the three-firm concentration ratio is the
best predictor of grocery prices in U.S. cities. Using market shares
instead, he finds that the leader's share is insignificant, the shares of
the second- and third-ranked firms are positive and highly significant, and
the share of the fourth-largest firm is significantly negatively related to
price. [Compare's Kwoka (1979) results for manufacturing PCM's.] On the
other hand, Cotterill (1986) finds that the H-index is the best predictor of
individual grocery stores' prices in Vermont.
Studies of the relation between prices and legal restrictions on local
advertising by eyeglass vendors [Benham (1972)] and retail pharmacies [Cady
(1976)] have produced strong results supporting:
Stulized Fact 5.2: Legal restrictions on local advertising in the
U.S. are associated with higher retail prices.
Kwoka (1984) finds that legal restrictions are unrelated to the average
quality of optometric services but negatively related to the dispersion in
quality levels available. Albion (1983) finds no relation between
advertising intensity at the manufacturing level and average retail markup
across product categories in data supplied by a U.S. supermarket chain, but
within categories he detects a negative relation, especially for highly-
advertised, widely-used products.
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5.2 Costs and Productivity
The shortcomings of accounting data might account for the apparently
stronger association between concentration and price than between
concentration and profitability. Another explanation might be that costs in
concentrated industries tend to be above minimum levels. This would occur
if rent-seeking efforts to attain or protect monopoly power elevated costs
in these industries substantially, if non-price competition was generally
sufficiently intense to erode profits, or if high prices in concentrated
industries tended to attract inefficiently small producers.
The first two hypotheses have apparently not been systematically
tested. On the third hypothesis, Weiss (1976) found that the fraction of
industry output produced in plants below (engineering/interview estimates
of) minimum efficient scale in U.S. manufacturing industries was negatively
related to concentration. Baldwin and Gorecki (1985) obtained similar
results for Canada, as did Scherer, Beckstein, Kaufer, and Murphy (1975) in
a detailed analysis of six nations and 12 industries.
On the other hand, Baldwin and Gorecki (1985) also found that
concentrated industries with strong tariff protection tended to have more
inefficient capacity, all else equal, and Bloch's (1974b) analysis of
Canadian/U.S. cost differences points in the same direction. This suggests
that cost elevation may occur only in concentrated industries protected from
entry by tariffs or other barriers.
A number of authors have employed data on U.S. local banking markets to
study the hypothesis that concentration is positively related to cost. [See
Gilbert (1984) for an overview.] Edwards (1977) found that banks in
concentrated markets demanded 76% more labor than other comparable banks; he
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argued that this reflected the ability of managers in concentrated markets
to exercise their preference for larger staffs. Hannan and Mavinga (1980),
who also looked at spending on furniture and equipment and on office space,
found a positive interaction between concentration and a dummy variable
indicating dispersed ownership and thus (presumably) management control.
But Smirlock and Marshall (1983) found that concentration was unrelated to
labor demand when bank size was controlled for.
Time-series studies over long periods do not find a positive relation
between changes in concentration and changes in costs. Instead, what
emerges from the work of Peltzman (1977), Lustgarten (1984), and Gisser
(1984) is
Stylized Fact 5.3: Over time, U.S. manufacturing industries that
experience large increases or decreases in concentration tend to
show above-average increases in productivity and below-average
increases in price.
Gisser (1984) finds that increases in concentration have stronger estimated
effects than decreases in initially unconcentrated industries, while the
reverse is true in concentrated industries. These results suggest that
major product, process, or marketing innovations are associated with large
absolute changes in concentration, with the sign of the change depending on
the source of the innovation.
Finally, one might hypothesize that costs in concentrated industries
are too high because firms in such industries have weak incentives to resist
union demands for supra-competitive wages. And Rose (1986) finds that
trucking deregulation in the U.S., which increased competition in that
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industry, lowered truck drivers' wages substantially. The large inter-
industry literature has produced less clear-cut results, however.
Weiss (1966) observed that wage rates were positively related to both
concentration and unionization in the U.S. in 1959; Phlips (1971) also found
positive relations between wages and concentration for Belgium, France, and
Italy. But Weiss found that when worker characteristics were added to his
regression, the concentration effect vanished, and the estimated impact of
unionization was weakened. The subsequent literature [surveyed by Dickens
and Katz (1986)] reveals a more complex pattern. Dickens and Katz (1986)
show that in U.S. data unionization and concentration are strongly
correlated with a number of other factors that might plausibly affect wages
(such as plant size, for instance), so that estimates of the effects of
concentration are very sensitive to the data set and specification employed.
Thus even though there do appear to be industry-level differences in wages
that cannot be explained by differences in employee characteristics, the
exact source of these differences is difficult to identify with available
cross-section data.3 7
Pugel (1980b) found that a measure of excess profit per labor hour was
more strongly positively related to U.S. industry-average wage rates than
was concentration; Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980) obtained similar results
with Canadian data. Pugel argued that his estimates implied that labor on
average captured 7-14% of excess profits. Karier (1985) added unionization
to a standard PCM equation for 1972 and argued that his estimates implied
that unions captured about 60% of excess profits. Voos and Mishel (1986)
obtained a significant negative coefficient of a (concentration x
unionization) interaction term in a study of supermarket profits. Their
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estimates implied that unions captured about 30% of profit increases due to
concentration. And when Salinger (1984) allowed unionization to interact
with (concentration x entry barriers) terms, he found that complete
unionization served to eliminate essentially all excess returns. On the
other hand, Clark (1984) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986b) find no
support for the argument that increases in unionization have a stronger
negative effect on profitability in high-concentration industries.
Several studies report important differences in the cyclical behavior
of wages in concentrated and unconcentrated industries. Haworth and Reuther
(1978) found that in U.S. industry-level wage equations with controls for
worker characteristics, concentration was positively related to wages in
1958, when unemployment was high, but not in prosperous 1967. They obtained
similar results for unionization and for a (concentration x unionization)
interaction variable. Analyses of a 1958-1981 panel data set for
U.S. manufacturing by Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b)
strongly confirms these findings. They first (1986a) observe that movements
in aggregate demand affect PCM's more strongly than movements in industry
sales, suggesting cyclical effects operating through economy-wide input
markets. They then (1986b) find that, especially in producer goods
industries, the coefficient of a (unionization x concentration x
unemployment rate) interaction is negative, implying that PCM's of highly
untionized, highly concentrated industries are compressed relative to those
of all industries on average during periods of low aggregate demand. These
findings together indicate that labor costs in concentrated, unionized
industries are less cyclically sensitive than average.
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6. Structure and Conduct
As Section 2 noted, seller concentration and advertising intensity are
determined at least in part by market processes. Sections 6.1 and 6.2,
respectively, consider studies in which these quantities appear as dependent
variables. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 deal with two additional conduct-related
phenomena: entry into and exit from industries, and the stability of market
shares and market positions within industries.
6.1 Seller Concentration
International comparisons of concentration levels for the 1950's [Bain
(1966)] and 1960's [Pryor (1972)] point to
Stylized Fact 6.1: Rank correlations of manufacturing industries'
concentration levels between industrialized nations are very
high. Among large industrialized nations, concentration levels do
not decline much with increases in the size of the economy.
The first sentence suggests that similar processes operate to determine
concentration levels everywhere, while the second indicates that firm size
and market size tend to be positively related internationally. On this
latter relation and its structural basis, see Scherer, Beckstein, Kaufer,
and Murphy (1975).
Most studies of seller concentration begin with some measure of minimum
efficient plant scale, often derived from the size distribution of existing
plants. [See Section 3.5 and, for a valuable survey, Curry and George
(1983).] Studies of Canada [Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980)], the
U.K. [Hart and Clarke (1980)], Belgium [Jacquemin, de Ghellinck, and
Huveneers (1980)], Japan [Caves and Uekusa (1976)], Germany [Neumann, Bobel,
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and Haid (1979)], and the U.S. [e.g., Comanor and Wilson (1967), Strickland
and Weiss (1976), Martin (1979a)] support
Stylized Fact 6.2: Levels of seller concentration are positively
related to estimates of the market share of a plant of minimum
efficient scale (MES).
Some studies report a positive relation between concentration and MES-based
estimates of the capital required to build an efficient plant,3 8 but
generally this variable performs less well than MES/market estimates [Curry
and George (1983)]. One might take Stylized Fact 6.2 as suggesting that
concentration is determined largely by production technology, but there are
several reasons why this inference is not completely justified.
First, the relation between MES/market ratios and concentration is much
weaker in first-differences than in levels in U.K. [Hart and Clarke (1980)]
and U.S. [Levy (1985), Martin (1979b)] data. This is consistent with the
second part of Stylized Fact 5.1 and with the generally weak relation
between market growth and changes in concentration over time.3 9
Second, frequently-used measures of minimum efficient plant scale
derived from the size distribution of existing plants are suspect for a
variety of reasons, as Section 3.5 noted. Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator
and Shrieves (1973) argue that the capital-labor ratio is a better indicator
of the underlying technology; they and others [e.g., Collins and Preston
(1969), Caves and Uekusa (1976)] provide strong support for
Stylized Fact 6.3: Capital-intensity is positively correlated with
concentration among U.S. manufacturing industries.
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Third, what ought to matter for seller concentration is scale economies
at the firm level, not at the plant level. But Neumann, Bobel, and Haid
(1979) are almost the only ones to employ a measure of mininimum efficient
firm scale in this context. In U.K. data, concentration is positively
related to the extent of multi-plant operations [Hart and Clarke (1980),
Curry and George (1983)], but there is an element of tautology in this
relation. [See also Scherer, Beckstein, Kaufer, and Murphy (1975) on the
determinants of plant scale and multi-plant operation.]
A number of authors have argued that there are scale economies in
advertising, so that minimum efficient firm size and thus concentration in
advertising-intensive industries should be higher than production scale
economies suggest. Several studies have found positive relations between
concentration and advertising intensity in U.S. data.4 0 And Cowling, Cable,
Kelly, and McGuinness (1975) find a positive relation between advertising
per firm and (survivorship estimates of) minimum efficient firm size,
controlling for (survivorship estimates of) minimum efficient plant size.
But other studies report no relation between advertising and concentration
changes in multivariate studies Hart and Clarke (1980), Curry and George
(1983), Levy (1985)].
Mueller and Rogers (1980) find that when they divide advertising
spending among media, only the ratio of television advertising to sales is
positively related to changes in U.S. concentration over the 1958-1972
period. This suggests that only television advertising involves important
scale economies -- presumably deriving from the large minimum outlays
necessary to use this medium efficiently. But Lynk (1981) finds that
concentration tended to fall in those U.S. industries that most rapidly
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increased the fraction of their advertising spending going to television
when the cost of TV fell in the 1950's and early 1960's.
Fourth, most engineering/interview estimates of.the importance of firm
-level scale economies suggest that existing levels of concentration,
particularly in the U.S., are higher than they would be if the leading
sellers were of minimum efficient scale [Scherer (1980, ch. 4)]. This,
again in combination with the second part of Stylized Fact 6.1, suggests
that other forces have operated to increase concentration.
If a number of firms have attained efficient scale thus have constant
unit cost, it may be reasonable to model their growth rates and sizes as
determined by stochastic processes. In the most famous model of this sort,
called Gibrat's Law, period-to-period changes in the logarithm of firm size
are independent, normal random variables. It follows that the distribution
of firm sizes will tend toward lognormality, with increasing variance (and
thus rising concentration) over time. Depending on assumptions about
growth, birth, and death, stochastic models can also generate the Pareto and
other skewed size distributions; see Ijiri and Simon (1977) for an overview.
Studies of actual size distributions in the U.S. [Quandt (1966),
Silberman (1967), Kwoka (1982)1 and the U.K. Clarke (1979), Davies and
Lyons (1982)] concentrate on the lognormal and Pareto distributions and
generally support:
Stylized Fact 6.4: Size distributions of firms and plants are
highly skewed; all families of distributions so far tried fail to
describe at least some industries well.
Neither the lognormal nor the Pareto consistently outperforms the other
[Curry and George (1983)].
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Early studies of firms' growth rates in the U.S. [Hymer and Pashigian
(1962), Mansfield (1962)] generally supported Gibrat's Law. But several
recent studies, using new, large data sets, have found that mean growth
rates decline with firm size [Evans (1987), Hall (1987), Dunne, Roberts, and
Samuelson (1987)], as does the probability of failure.
Stylized Fact 6.5: In U.S. data, mean firm growth rates and
failure probabilities decline with firm size. The standard
deviation of growth rates declines with size, but less rapidly
than the reciprocal of the square root of size.
Mean growth rates in the U.S. also seem to decline with firm age [Evans
(1987), Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1987)]. Results on mean growth rates
abroad are mixed. Singh and Whittington (1975) found a weak positive
relation between size and mean growth in the U.K., while Jacquemin and Saez
(1976) found a negative relation for large European firms, but no relation
for large Japanese firms.
To understand the significance of the second part of Stylized Fact 6.5,
note that if Gibrat's Law held exactly and large firms were simply
collections of small firms with uncorrelated growth, the standard deviation
of growth rates would decline as [firm size]- 1 / 2. The slower decline
observed in many studies suggests that large firms specialize in correlated
activities. But Daskin (1983) finds that larger U.S. firms have more stable
growth even after controlling for diversification patterns.
It is important to recognize that variations in growth rates alone do
not determine firm size distributions: entry, exit, and mergers may also be
important. Until recently, antitrust restrictions on horizontal mergers in
the U.S. were quite strict, and such mergers were a relatively unimportant
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source of increases in concentration. For the U.K., however, Hannah and Kay
(1977) conclude that, while stochastic rate growth differences were an
important source of increases in concentration, mergers were much more
important. Muller (1976) also argues that mergers were important in
maintaining high concentration in West Germany despite rapid market growth.
While controversy remains, it seems safe [Curry and George (1983)] to assert
Stylized Fact 6.6: Outside the U.S., mergers have been an
important source of increases in seller concentration.
6.2 Advertising Intensity
Numerous regression analyses in which advertising intensity is the
dependent variable have confirmed the positive advertising-profitability
relation discussed in Section 4.4.41 Telser (1964) found that
advertising/sales ratios were unrelated to concentration in the U.S., but
Mann, Henning, and Meehan (1967) found a positive relation. [Comanor and
Wilson (1979) discuss the interpretation of this relation.] Subsequent
studies generally support the existence of a positive concave or inverted-U
relation:42
Stylized Fact 6.7: Among consumer goods industries, advertising
intensity increases with concentration at low levels of
concentration; the relation may vanish or change sign at high
levels of concentration.
The observation that advertising intensity may decrease with increases in
concentration in concentrated industries suggests, somewhat implausibly,
that sellers in such industries not infrequently collude to reduce
advertising outlays.
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Ornstein (1977) argued that the positive relation between advertising
intensity and concentration in the U.S. was roughly as strong in producer
goods industries as in consumer goods industries. But Bradburd (1980)
showed that when these two groups were defined more strictly (using the
fraction of sales made to retailers), a positive, concave relation emerged
for consumer goods, but no relation was apparent for producer goods. [See
also Weiss, Pascoe, and Martin (1983).] Buxton, Davies, and Lyons (1984)
posited different relations for pure producer and consumer goods industries
and used data on the fraction of sales made to retailers to estimate an
interactive model for industries selling both. They reported no relation
for producer goods in U.K. data and an inverted-U relation for consumer
goods.4 3
Within consumer good industries, Comanor and Wilson (1974) found that
leading firms had higher advertising/sales ratios than followers when the
industry advertising/sales ratio was low, but that leaders spent a smaller
percentage of revenue on advertising when the industry ratio was high. The
latter pattern has been found by Lambin (1976) in European data and by
Farris and Buzzell (1979) in a study of advertising and promotion outlays.
6.3 Entry and Exit
Basic price theory implies that entry will occur if and only if
potential entrants expect post-entry prices to be at least equal to their
costs. Bain (1956) argued that entrants' expectations are determined by the
height of pre-entry profits relative to structural entry barriers; recent
theoretical work has shown that strategic behavior of incumbent firms can
also affect entrants's expectations.
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Official data usually show some entry in almost all industries by firms
that attain negligible market shares, so empirical work seeks to explain
differences in the importance of entry across industries. This has been
measured by the absolute or relative, gross or net change in the number of
firms [Mansfield (1962), Orr (1974a), Deutsch (1975), Gorecki (1975, 1976)],
by the occurrance of substantial entry [Harris (1976a)], and by the market
share achieved by entrants [Harris (1976b), Masson and Shaanan (1982),
MacDonald (1986)]. [See Geroski (1983) for useful survey.] While the last
of these seems the most satisfactory, Hause and Du Rietz (1984) use both the
number of entrants and their share of industry employment and report broadly
similar results for both measures in Swedish data.
Mansfield (1962) studied four industries (steel, petroleum, tires, and
autos) over time and found that the ratio of new firms at the end of a
decade to firms at the start was positively related to profitability during
the period and negatively related to the capital cost of a firm of minimum
efficient scale. While some subsequent studies also report a positive
effect of profits [Harris (1976a, 1976b), Masson and Shaanan (1982)],
insignificant coefficients seem at least as common [Orr (1974a), Deutsch
(1975), Gorecki (1976)1. Since behavior designed to deter entry can be
expected to lower pre-entry profits, the lack of a robust relation between
pre-entry profits and the level of entry may not be terribly surprising.
Similarly, while some studies [Deutsch (1975), Hause and Du Rietz
(1984), MacDonald (1986)] report a positive relation between growth and
entry, others find no relation [Orr (1974a), Harris (1976b), Masson and
Shaanan (1982)]. Gorecki (1976) finds that growth is positively related to
foreign entry into Canadian manufacturing industries but unrelated to
66
domestic entry. [Gorecki (1975) reports significant differences between the
correlates of entry into U.K. industries by new firms and by those
established elsewhere.] On theoretical grounds one would expect anticipated
and unanticipated growth to have different effects on entry, but Bradburd
and Caves (1982) did not find this distinction helpful in explaining
profitability differences.
Harris (1976b) examined entry during the 1950-1966 period into
U.S. industries for which structural entry barriers had been assessed by
Bain (1956) and Mann (1966). Nine of the 18 industries with above-average
pre-entry profitability experienced substantial entry; of the nine
industries classed as having "very high" entry barriers, four experienced
substantial entry.4 4 The Bain/Mann judgements about overall entry barriers
did not seem to predict the actual occurance of entry terribly well.
Following Mansfield (1962), a number of authors have employed measures
of the market share or capital cost of a plant of minimum efficient scale to
capture the impact of scale-related entry barriers. And, as in the
profitability literature, both are rarely signficiant, but at least one
usually is:4 5
Stylized Fact 6.8: Measures of scale economies or capital
requirements tend to be negatively related to entry.
Harris (1976b) found substantial entry into only two of the 12
industries in which product differentiation was held to be an important
source of barriers by Bain (1956) and Mann (1966), and into only one of the
seven of these industries with above-average profits. Since advertising
intensity is highly correlated in this sample with high estimated product
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differentiation barriers, this is consistent with other work that
supports:46
Stylized Fact 6.9: Advertising intensity is negatively related to
entry in manufacturing industries.
Some studies have included concentration in equations designed to
explain entry; see Kessides (1986) for a discussion. Positive [Deutsch
(1975)], negative [Orr (1974a), Kessides (1986)], and insignificant [Harris
(1976a)] coefficients have been reported. Hause and Du Rietz (1984) find
the existence of a cartel agreement to be negatively related to entry in
Swedish manufacturing industries.
Mansfield (1962) also studied the incidence of exit. He found that the
fraction of firms leaving an industry was negatively related to the ratio of
average size to minimum efficient scale and to industry profitability.
Marcus (1967) found that the incidence of accounting losses was a better
predictor of exit than the average level of profits, and he found that
small, young firms were the most likely to incur losses. Studies of exit
from unprofitable, declining industries by Caves and Porter (1976) and
Harrigan (1986) suggest that exit is delayed by the existence of tangible
and intangible industry-specific assets, as well as by managerial and
strategic factors.
6.4 Share and Rank Stability
Mueller (1986) observes that in 41% of 350 U.S. manufacturing
industries with essentially the same official definition in 1950 and 1972,
the leading firm was the same in both years. (Note that industries in which
technical change has been important are underrepresented in samples of this
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sort.) He finds that leaders' market shares tend to persist over long
periods as well [see also Shepherd (1974)]. While stable market shares and
firm ranks are consistent in principle with either collusion or competition,
most would argue that unstable shares and ranks are inconsistent with
effective collusion. Unfortunately, data limitations have kept the
empirical literature on rank and share stability thin.
In an early study of rank changes, Mansfield (1962) found that small
firms were less likely to grow to exceed the size of previously larger
rivals in older, more concentrated industries. A number of studies of rank
changes among leading banks (mobility) and changes in the identity of the
leaders (turnover) have reported negative relations between concentration
and both mobility and turnover [Gilbert (1984)]. But, as Marlow, Link, and
Trost (1984) point out, the measures used in these studies are counts of
changes, and least-squares is inappropriate for such discrete, bounded
dependent variables. Using nonlinear methods with data on U.S. savings and
loan associations, they find no relation between concentration and
turnover. While they do detect a weak negative relation between
concentration and mobility, it has very little explanatory power.
Studies of market share stability generally employ sums across firms of
the absolute values of either absolute or relative changes in shares to
measure instability. Gort (1963) found a positive relation between
concentration and share stability but no relation involving (judgemental
estimates of) product differentiation or profitability. His work, along
with the studies discussed in the previous paragraph and the results of
Caves and Porter (1978) and Heggestad and Rhoades (1978), points toward
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Stylized Fact 6.10: In manufacturing industries and local banking
markets in the U.S., market shares tend to be more stable the
higher is concentration.
Telser (1964) found a negative relation between advertising intensity
and stability in a small sample of industries. While Reekie (1974) found a
negative relation for markets within two product classes, he detected a
positive relation within two others. And, consistent with Gort's (1963)
results, Lambin (1976) and Caves and Porter (1976) found no relation between
advertising/sales ratios and share stability.
7. Conclusions and Implications
I have argued that inter-industry research in industrial organization
should generally be viewed as a search for empirical regularities, not as a
set of exercises in structural estimation. And I have attempted to show
that research in this tradition has indeed uncovered many stable, robust,
empirical regularities. Inter-industry research has taught us much about
how markets look, especially within the manufacturing sector in developed
economies, even if it has not shown us exactly how markets work.
This literature has also produced an impressive, if implicit, agenda
for future research. It seems difficult to reconcile the set of Stylized
Facts discussed above with any familiar simple view of the world; some
Stylized Facts seen difficult to reconcile with each other. Work in some
areas has produced no clear picture of the important patterns in the data,
and non-manufacturing industries have not received attention commensurate
with their importance. The literature is full of interesting results that
beg for attempts at replication.
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But cross-section studies are limited by serious problems of
interpretation and measurement. Future inter-industry research should adopt
a modest, descriptive orientation and aim to complement case studies by
uncovering robust empirical regularities that can be used to evaluate and
develop theoretical tools. Finally, it is important to note that much of
the most persuasive recent work relies on non-standard data sources,
particularly panel data (which can be used to deal with disequilibrium
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1. Other chapters in this Handbook discuss related work on the dynamics of
pricing behavior (Dennis Carlton), technical change (Richard Levin),
and international comparisons (Richard Caves). The chapter by Timothy
Bresnahan considers single-industry studies concerned with many of the
issues treated here.
2. Useful surveys of portions of the cross-section literature include
Weiss (1971, 1974), Ferguson (1974), Jacquemin and deJong (1977),
Comanor and Wilson (1979), Hay and Morris (1979, chs. 7 and 12),
Scherer (1980, chs. 4 and 9), Brozen (1982), Geroski (1983), Curry and
George (1983), Gilbert (1984), Waterson (1984, ch. 10), and Caves (1985).
3. For general discussions of the cross-section approach, see Phillips
(1976), Cowling (1976), Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980, ch. 1), Sawyer
(1982), and Donsimoni, Geroski, and Jacquemin (1984), in addition to
the surveys cited in note 2, above. Caves and Pugel (1980) provide a
nice discussion of the long-run equilibrium presumption and use it
explicitly to structure their analysis.
4. Martin (1979a,b) has pointed out that the original Strickland-Weiss
(1976) model is not identified, even if one assumes all their
judgements about exogeneity are correct.
5. Studies using simultaneous equations methods include Comanor and Wilson
(1974), Geroski (1982), Marvel (1980), Caves, Porter and Spence (1980),
Martin (1983), and Connolly and Hirschey (1984).
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6. But the general similarity between the coefficient estimates produced
by least squares and simultaneous equations techniques in cross-section
studies does present something of a puzzle. (I am indebted to Jerry
Hausman for posing this problem and for suggesting the development that
follows.) Consider the simplest possible structural equation: y = x +
£, where y, x, and have mean zero, and is a constant. Suppose that
x is correlated with , as is a proposed instrumental variable, z. Let
0o and i be the ordinary least squares and instrumental variables
estimates of , respectively. Then a bit of algebra shows that the
probability limit (i-Bo)/B o is given by
[(l-Ro2)/Ro2]1/2[(PzE/Pzx)PPx£ ]/[l-(px) ] ,
where Ro2 is the least-squares R2 , the 's are standard deviations, and
the p's are correlations. In time-series studies with trendy
variables, xz and Ro2 will be close to one, so that even if z is a
terrible instrument (so that PZE and PxE are approximately equal), the
difference between least squares and instrument variables estimates
will generally be small. In cross-section data, however, xz and Ro2
are generally well below one, so that large changes in coefficients
would be expected to be the rule even with poor instruments.
7. Suppose the structural equation for some variable, y, involves a set of
independent variables, X, some of which are endogenous, and a
disturbance term, . This equation can be consistently estimated by
least squares as long as y does not enter the structural equations for
the endogenous elements of X and is uncorrelated with the
disturbances of those equations. That is, y must not affect X
directly, and the unobservable variables determining X and y must be
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uncorrelated.
8. At the simplest level, industry averages over relatively long time
periods shed more light on long-run differences than observations for
any single year. More generally, modern econometric techniques make it
possible to combine inter-temporal (within-unit) and inter-industry
(between-unit) information efficiently and to perform revealing
specification tests; see Hausman and Taylor (1981).
9. Assmus, Farley, and Lehmann (1984) and the references they cite discuss
formal approaches to the analysis of multiple studies, the use of which
is effectively precluded here by the breadth of the literature covered.
10. See, for instance, Ornstein (1972), Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980),
Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Liebowitz (1982a), Martin (1979b), Salinger
(1984), and Hirschey (1985).
11. These problems apply in the U.S. to data published by the Internal
Revenue Service, the Census of Manufactures, and the Federal Trade
Commission's Line-of-Business program, respectively.
12. One should not be misled by this example: in general the time-path of
Hotelling depreciation does not have the form of the cash-flow profile
-- nor, necessarily, of standard accounting depreciation schemes.
13. For instance, under the assumptions made to derive equation (3.10), if
d = 6, then 6 equals the observed accounting depreciation/assets ratio,
and the inflation-induced bias in the rate of return on assets can be
corrected by multiplying both assets and depreciation by (g+6+i)/(g+6).
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14. For detailed discussions of Bain's (1951) study, see Brozen's (1970,
1971) critique and the responses by Qualls (1974) and Weiss (1974).
15. Gort and Singamsetti (1976) and Kessides (1987) come up with 10%,
Schmalensee (1985) with 20%, and Ross (1986) with 30%. [The Scott-
Pascoe (1986) estimates are not strictly comparable.] Mueller (1986,
pp. 218-9) argues plausibly that the Schmalensee and Ross estimates may
be unusually high because of the extraordinary impact of the first oil
shock in 1975, the year covered by their data.
16. Imel, Behr, and Helmberger (1972) demonstrate that heteroskedasticity
is almost certainly present in regression analysis of the profitability
of diversified firms. Unfortunately the data needed to estimate the
disturbance covariance matrix consistently are rarely available. But
even if fully efficient estimation is not possible, White's (1980)
techniques can be used to avoid biased inferences.
17. Mueller (1986) controls for disequilibrium by using time series data to
estimate the steady-state profitability of each firm in his sample.
18. See Imel, Behr, and Helmberger (1972), Telser (1972, ch. 8), Lustgarten
(1975), Peltzman (1977), Thomadakis (1977), LaFrance (1979), Marvel
(1980) and Masson and Shaanan (1982). de Melo and Urata (1986) find a
positive relation in Chilean data in 1979 but not in 1967.
19. Examples include Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1974), Ornstein (1972,
1975), Vernon and Nourse (1973), Boyer (1974), Gort and Singamsetti
(1976), Cattin and Wittink (1976), Porter (1976a, ch. 6), Strickland




20. Theory suggests that the conduct, and thus the profitability, of multi-
product firms that encounter each other in multiple markets ought to be
affected by these contacts, as well as by concentration in the relevant
markets. Scott (1982) finds strong support for an interactive version
of this hypothesis in data on U.S. manufacturing markets in 1974, but
Gilbert (1984) notes that (generally less sophisticated) investigations
of this hypothesis using data on banking markets have produced
relatively weak results.
21. Hay and Kelley (1974) find that explicit collusion in the U.S. tends to
occur most frequently in concentrated industries (especially where
products are homogeneous) and to involve only a few firms. This
generally supports the notion that concentration facilitates
collusion. But explicit collusion is illegal and apparently relatively
rare in the U.S., and if concentration made tacit collusion easy,
sellers in concentrated industries would not need to break the law.
22. Examples include Geroski's (1982) study of the U.K., Chou's (1986)
study of Taiwan, work on West German data by Neumann, Bobel, and Haid
(1979, 1985), and studies of the U.S. by Martin (1979a) and Marvel
(1980). de Melo and Urata (1986) find a positive relation for Chile,
which they attribute to quantitative import restrictions.
23. Examples include studies of U.S. data by White (1976), Pugel (1980a),
and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a), a study of Belgian data by
Jacquemin, de Ghellinck, and Huveneers (1980), a study of Chile by de
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Melo and Urata (1986) and work by Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980) with
Canadian data.
24. It is worth noting that most studies in which import penetration is the
dependent variable find it positively related to both domestic
concentration and profitability; see Marvel (1980), Caves, Porter, and
Spence (1980), and Caves (1985). [Chou (1986) does not detect these
relations in data for Taiwan, however.] It is also interesting to note
that specification tests tend to signal the endogeneity of imports,
while not flagging other logically endogenous variables [Geroski
(1982)]. Finally, in related work, Feinberg (1986) reports that when
the German mark fell sharply in 1977-83, so that import competition
generally declined, domestic prices rose less in more concentrated
industries.
25. Replications include the work of Caves and Uekusa (1976) with Japanese
data, Round's (1983) study of Australian data, studies of U.K. data by
Cowling, Cable, Kelly, and McGuinness (1975) and Geroski (1982), and
analyses of U.S. data by Imel, Behr, and Helmberger (1972), Vernon and
Nourse (1973), Strickland and Weiss (1976), Carter (1978), Martin
(1979a, 1979b), Marvel (1980), Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1981), Masson
and Shaanan (1982), Harris (1984), Bothwell, Cooley and Hall (1984),
and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b).
26. Since advertising is usually omitted from variable costs in calculating
the PCM, the relevant null hypothesis in studies using this measure of
profitability is that the coefficient of the advertising/sales ratio is
equal to unity. Coefficients above unity imply a positive relation
I.,
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between advertising intensity and profits net of advertising outlays;
coefficients below unity imply a negative relation.
27. Indeed, Leonard Weiss reports (personal communication to the author,
July 1986) that he has been unable to replicate the Hall and Weiss
(1967) findings with more recent and more complete data.
28. Of course these results are also consistent with the hypotheses that
collusion is common and that large firms tend to benefit
disproportionately from it.
29. Demsetz (1973, 1974) obtained similar results using absolute firm size
instead of market share [see also Kilpatrick (1968)], but, as Daskin
(1983) showed, these findings do not bear directly on the differential
efficiency hypothesis that he presents. Note also Porter's (1979)
finding that the inter-industry standard deviation in profit rates of
leading firms was about 80% larger than the standard deviation of
smaller firms' profit rates.
30. Examples include Bothwell and Keeler (1976), Gale and Branch (1982),
Martin (1983), Ravenscraft (1983), Bothwell, Cooley, and Hall (1984),
Harris (1984), Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984), Schmalensee
(1985), Smirlock (1985), Mueller (1986), Ross (1986), and Kessides
(1987). Shepherd (1974, ch. 4) and Thomadakis (1977) found positive
coefficients of both share and concentration, but their sample
selection procedures have been questioned [Hirschey (1985)]. On the
other hand, Neumann, Bobel, and Haid (1979) report a positive and
significant concentration coefficient along with a significant negative
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market share effect in West German data. [See also Scott and Pascoe
(1986).]
31. See, for instance, Collins and Preston (1969), Comanor and Wilson
(1974), Cattin and Wittink (1976), Porter (1979), Caves and Pugel
(1980), Daskin (1983), and Schmalensee (1987). Using FTC line of
business data, Ross (1986) finds that market share is more strongly
related to profitability in consumer goods industries than in producer
goods, and Kessides (1987) strongly rejects the hypothesis that the
market share -- profitability relation is stable across industries.
32. Ravenscraft (1983) and Smirlock (1985) report negative coefficients of
concentration-share interaction terms, for instance; see also Caves and
Pugel (1980), Daskin (1983), Rhoades (1985), and Schmalensee (1987).
But Mueller (1986) reports a robust negative coefficient of [(1-share)
x concentration].
33. Stonebraker (1976) finds that measures of small firm distress are
positively related to large firm profitability when industry growth is
controlled for. These same measures are positively correlated with
industry advertising and R&D intensity. This suggests that Stylized
Fact 4.13 can be extended to include R&D, as do the results of Mueller
(1986).
34. These include life insurance [Cummins, Denenberg, and Scheel (1972)],
banking services [Gilbert (1984) provides a survey], cement [Koller and
Weiss (1986)], off-shore oil and timber auctions [Brannman, Klein, and
Weiss (1987)] air transportation [Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985)],
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newspaper advertising [Stigler (1964), Thompson (1984)], radio
advertising [Stigler (1964)], groceries [Lamm (1981), Geithman, Marvel,
and Weiss (1981), Cotterill (1986)], gasoline [Marvel (1978), Geithman,
Marvel, and Weiss (1981)], and bond underwriting [Geithman, Marvel, and
Weiss (1981), Brannman, Klein, and Weiss (1987)].
35. It is worth noting, however, that Cummins, Denenberg, and Scheel (1972)
find that premiums for group life insurance do not rise with
concentration. And, while Marvel (1978) finds that the lowest price
charged for gasoline in any area rises with concentration, the relation
involving the highest price is statistically insignificant.
36. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1987) find that even though margins
are more pro-cyclical in more concentrated industries, prices move
counter-cyclically in concentrated producer-goods industries with high
average margins. These findings are reconciled by observing that cost
movements are especially strongly counter-cyclical for the latter
industries.
37. Landon (1970) finds that printers' wages are lower in cities with more
concentrated newspaper markets. But since newspaper unions are very
strong and almost all U.S. newspaper markets very highly concentrated
(many are monopolies), it is not clear how general this result is.
38. See, for instance, Comanor and Wilson (1967), Caves, Porter, and Spence
(1980), and Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1981).
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39. See Martin (1979b), Mueller and Rogers (1980), Pagoulatos and Sorenson
(1981), Levy (1985), Curry and George (1983); but see also Ornstein,
Weston, Intriligator, and Shrieves (1973).
40. Examples include Ornstein, Weston, Intriligator, and Shrieves (1973),
Strickland and Weiss (1976), Caves, Porter, and Spence (1980), Mueller
and Rogers (1980), Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1981), and Connolly and
Hirschey (1984); see also the studies discussed in Section 6.2, in
which advertising intensity is the dependent variable.
41. See, for instance, Comanor and Wilson (1974), Strickland and Weiss
(1976), Martin (1979a, 1979b), Farris and Buzzell (1979), Caves,
Porter, and Spence (1980), and Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1981); but see
Martin (1983), who reports a negative relation.
42. Examples include studies of Canadian [Caves, Porter, and Spence
(1980)], U.K. [Cowling, Cable, Kelly, and McGuinness (1975)], and
U.S. data [Strickland and Weiss (1976), Martin (1979a, 1979b),
Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1981), and Connolly and Hirschey (1984)]; see
also Lambin (1976).
43. Arterburn and Woodbury (1981) studied the frequency with which price
was mentioned in national magazine ads for 37 consumer goods in the
U.S. in the early 1970's. They found that price was more likely to be
mentioned the higher was the industry PCM and the lower was
concentration. The coefficient of the industry advertising/sales ratio
was negative for convenience goods but positive for non-convenience
goods.
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44. Harris (1976b) found that substantial entry tended to lower
profitability, though industries with very high barriers (which tended
to have high advertising/sales ratios) were still more profitable than
average even after substantial entry.
45. Studies finding a negative effect of capital requirements include Orr
(1974a), Gorecki (1976), Hause and Du Rietz (1984), and MacDonald
(1986). [Gorecki (1976) finds a significant effect only for domestic
entrants. Hause and Du Rietz (1984) use the mean employment in plants
built by entrants.] Studies by Gorecki (1975), Harris (1976a), and
Masson and Shaanan (1982) find a negative effect of MES/market.
46. Support is provided by studies of Canadian [Orr (1974a), Gorecki
(1976)] and U.S. data [Deutsch (1975), Harris (1976a), Masson and
Shaanan (1982)]. [See also Kessides (1986).] But MacDonald (1986)
fails to detect an advertising effect in his study of U.S. food
processing industries during the 1970's. And Gorecki (1975) finds that
specialist entry into U.K. manufacturing industries is negatively
related to advertising per firm but positively related to the industry
advertising/sales ratio.
------------------
